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DECORATING THE STRUCTURE:
THE ART OF MAKING HUMAN LAW
BRIAN M. MCCALL'
In a prior article, I described the Eternal Law as a
foundation on which human law is built.1 The Eternal Law,
which is God's providential ordering of the universe, establishes
the natures of things and thereby determines their ends.2 St.
Thomas Aquinas uses the two concepts of exemplar and type to
describe the Eternal Law.3
These concepts are helpful in
understanding how the Eternal Law moves one particular
creature-humans-to their end. Since Man is distinguished by
a faculty for reason, it is this very rationality that is decreed as
the method of achieving his end.4 Thus, the Eternal Law does
not specify the means of attaining this end with particularity, but
rather, like an exemplar in the field of art, it guides towards that
end while leaving scope for detailed variations.5 On the basis of
this exemplar, human reason deduces a framework of general
principles of action, or precepts of the Natural Law, and thereby
participates in the Eternal Law.6 Yet, as I examined in another
prior article, Man's capacity to deduce and specify these precepts
correctly has been seriously distorted, so much so that St.
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Foundation-theEternal and Natural Laws, 10 VERA LEX 47, 47 (2009) [hereinafter
McCall, The Architecture of Law].
2 See id. at 59-60.
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Thomas Aquinas claimed the Natural Law had been destroyed in
us. 7 To assist in overcoming this infirmity, God promulgated a
new law, the Lex Scriptura, or the revealed Divine Law. The
Divine Law contains general principles of action that are part of
the Natural Law in order to present a more reliable guide in
deducing and specifying the principles of the Natural Law than
unaided human reason.8
Having explored the foundation and framework for making
particular law, it is now possible to turn to that law which is first
in our order of knowledge-although last in the order of beinghuman positive law. The first Part of this Article describes the
nature and purpose of, and process for formulating, human law.
Notwithstanding having argued strongly in prior articles that
Natural Law is an indispensable form of law that must undergird
all human laws for them to be truly law, one might expect this
Article to argue for the simple proposition that law is merely
whatever the Natural Law establishes. Yet, as Part I of the
Article demonstrates, the relationship between Natural Law and
human law is more complex. The general precepts of Natural
Law are in need of specific determination through a complex
dialectical process involving the general principles of Natural
Law, historically developing communal customs, and statutory
enactments. The second Part of the Article applies the analysis
from Part I to two specific questions confronting the process of
human lawmaking: (1) the benefits and shortcomings of a
common law (or "case law") tradition versus the civil law (or
"code") tradition, and (2) the problem of the significant
proliferation and complexity of modern legislation.
I.
A.

ADORNING THE STRUCTURE WITH

HUMAN LAWS

How Human Lawmaking Fits into the Structure

Having examined the foundation-Eternal Law, the framing
structure-Natural Law, and the on-site instructions of the
architect-Divine Law, a survey of law can finally turn to the
detailed completion of the edifice accomplished by what Jean
Porter, relying on scholastic precedent, calls the "ministers of the
See Brian M. McCall, Consulting the Architect When Problems Arise-the
Divine Law, 9 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 109-11 (2011) [hereinafter McCall, The
Divine Law].
s See id. at 104.
7
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law."9 In the architectural analogy these "ministers" can be
viewed as the skilled "craftsmen" of the law. They particularize
the details of Natural Law's general precepts, reinforced by
Divine Law, which arise out of the foundation of Eternal Law. 10
To reach this level of specificity, a long road of analysis has been
necessary. This is natural, since unlike for the legal positivist,
human law is not the Alpha and Omega of the field of law. As
my prior articles have demonstrated, human law has a limited,
albeit significant, role in the grand edifice of law. It is only one
part of a vast system of law-Eternal, Natural and Divine-that
is interrelated and interdependent.1 1 My prior analysis of Divine
Law has already elucidated the purpose of human lawmaking as
the specification of Natural Law's principles, which is
accomplished by formulating specific determinations of those
principles when they affect the common good. 2 As this Part will
argue, this understanding already places a significant
qualification on the process of human lawmaking. Human laws
are dependent upon the Natural Law because the very reason for
the existence of human law is to make particular determinations
of the principles of this higher law.13 Human law cannot exist as
such without the Natural Law. Returning to the architectural
analogy, one cannot paint a fresco until a wall has been erected
on a foundation; crown molding cannot be installed until the
walls have been erected.
Likewise, human law cannot be
properly made outside the foundation and framework of Eternal
and Natural Law.
Yet, in a certain sense, Natural Law cannot exist without
human law because Natural Law needs to be made particular, to
be specified. As Jean Porter has observed, Natural Law is not a
self-executing legal code that merely needs enforcement. 14

9 See JEAN PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW: A NATURAL LAW THEORY OF LEGAL
AUTHORITY 223 (2010) [hereinafter PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW].
10 See id. at 60-62.

,1See Patrick McKinley Brennan, Persons, Participating,and "HigherLaw," 36
PEPP. L. REV. 475, 484-85 (2009) [hereinafter Brennan, Persons, Participating,and
"HigherLaw'l (describing the role of higher law in human lawmaking).
12 See McCall, The Divine Law, supra note 7, at 126-27.
13 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGLAE, pt. I-II, Q. 91, art. 3, at 997
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros., Inc. 1947) (12661273) [hereinafter SUMMA THEOLOGIAE].
14 See JEAN PORTER, NATURAL AND DIVINE LAW: RECLAIMING THE TRADITION
FOR CHRISTIAN ETHICS 159 (1999) [hereinafter PORTER, NATURAL AND DIVINE LAW].
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Rather, its general principles require further specification. 15 An
architectural plan might call for a fresco of the Last Supper, but
the fresco does not exist until an actual fresco is painted by an
artist. The Natural Law contains general principles to guide
human action: do good, preserve life, and so forth. 16 As St.
Thomas Aquinas explains, the content of Natural Law:
[Has to be determined by Divine or human law, because
naturally known principles are universal, both in speculative
and in practical matters. Accordingly just as the determination
of the universal principle about Divine worship is effected by
the ceremonial precepts, so the determination of the general
precepts of that justice which is17 to be observed among men is
effected by the judicial precepts.
St. Thomas Aquinas's example is helpful to understand this
need for additional law beyond Natural Law. We can know from
the use of our reason that if the world has been created by a
Being, then that Being deserves in justice to be adored as the
source of our existence. Yet, such knowledge, although making
known the obligation, does not explain to us specifically how we
should perform this act of justice towards our Creator. God
therefore revealed particular determinations of this general and
universal principle.18 Likewise, Natural Law obligates Men to
act justly. As with the ceremonial precepts, judicial precepts are
needed to specify how to live justly.
Prior to the coming of Christ, due to the absence of the
fullness of grace, Man needed more assistance in these
determinations. Again, St. Thomas Aquinas's discussion of the
relationship between habituation or training, and the ability to
reach correct conclusions or determinations, is necessary to
understand this distinction. 9 In the time of the Old Law, Men
were not yet "possessed of a virtuous habit" and thus needed
direct Divine determination of more particular laws.2 ° Thus, in
addition to promulgating certain principles of the Natural Law as
moral precepts of Divine Law, God also revealed specific
determinations of those general precepts in the judicial precepts

1 See id. at 153-54.
16

See McCall, The Architecture of Law, supra note 1, at 89-90.

17SUMMA THEOLOGLAE, supra note 13, pt. I-II, Q. 99, art. 4, at 1034.
18

See id. pt. I-I, Q. 99, art. 3, at 1033.

19 See McCall, The Divine Law, supra note 7, at 121, 126.
20 See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-II, Q. 107, art. 1, at 1109.
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of the Divine Law.2 ' Although human lawmakers existed, much
lawmaking was done directly by God by revealing particular
determinations of the Natural Law such as rules regarding the
forgiveness of debts,2 2 the time of payment of wages to laborers,23
the particular punishments for crimes, and measures of damages
for deliberate or negligent harms caused to others.24 After the
advent of grace-which St. Thomas Aquinas calls "an interior
habit bestowed on us and inclining us to act aright"2 5-Men could
be "endowed with virtuous habits" and thus were no longer in
such need of Divine determinations as in the judicial precepts.2 6
Once the human mind was capable of receiving the aid of an
additional habit or training through the availability of the
fullness of grace, the new Divine Law became a "law of liberty"27
and the particular determinations of Natural Law contained in
the judicial precepts ceased to bind directly.28
With the
availability of this grace to help discipline Men in virtue, the
moral precepts of the Divine Law remained in force as "they are
of themselves essential to virtue," being synonymous with the
general principles of the Natural Law.2 9 However, the particular
determinations of the judicial precepts were "left to the decision
of [men]."° Put another way, once the habit of grace was made
available, God could readjust the responsibilities for particular
lawmaking, leaving more to the discretion of human agents.
These particular determinations are made within what
Russell Hittinger calls three orders of prudence: the individual,
the familial, and the regnative.2
Some of these necessary
determinations are left to individuals to decide for themselves.3 2
Others are determined for individuals by their personal

21
22
22
24

See id. pt. I-II, Q. 99, art. 4, at 1034.
See Leviticus 25:23-25 (New American).
See Deuteronomy 24:15 (New American).
See Exodus 21:1-22:30 (New American).

25 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-I,

added).
26 Id. pt.
27 Id. pt.
21 Id.
pt.
29 Id. pt.
30 Id. pt.

I-II,
I-II,
I-I,
I-II,
I-II,

Q.
Q.
Q.
Q.
Q.

107,
108,
104,
108,
108,

art. 1, at
art. 1, at
art. 3, at
art. 3, at
art. 2, at

Q. 108, art. 1, at 1114 (emphasis

1108.
1113.
1089-1090, pt. I-I, Q. 108, art. 3, at 1117.
1117.
1115.
31 RUSSELL HITTINGER, THE FIRST GRAcE 99 (2003); see also SUMMA
THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-I, Q. 90, art. 3, at 995.
32 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-II, Q. 108, art. 1, at 1114.
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superiors,3 3 such as parents for children, and those
determinations that affect the common good 34 are left "to the
discretion of those who were to have spiritual or temporal charge
of others."35 This same threefold division traditionally divided
the study of Moral Philosophy into Monastics or Ethics-the
study of the relation of individual acts of Man to his end;
Morality of the Family or Economics-the study of the operations
of domestic society; and Political Philosophy or Morality of Civil
Society-the study of the operations of civil society.36 With the
coming of the fullness of grace, which made the perfection of
reason possible, God allowed more freedom in the determination
of particular acts and withdrew the specific judicial precepts of
the Old Law that ruled this third order, civil society, thereby
entrusting the formulation of particular determinations related
to civil society, to laws made by humans rather than to Divine
Law.37
It is in making these particular determinations of
Natural Law that human beings participate in the Eternal Law
or, put another way, participate in God's providential lawmaking
for the universe.
Just as St. Thomas Aquinas's consideration of the Eternal
Law highlighted both God's rationality and volition,38 human
lawmaking employs both aspects of human nature. As we have
seen, human law is dependent upon Natural Law, or the rational
participation of Man in the Eternal Law.3 ' Human laws are the
"particular determinations, devised by human reason" from the
precepts of the Natural Law.4 ° Thus, the process of making
human law must employ the use of right reason. The matter
used by human reason in the process is the "singular and
contingent"4 1
"individual
cases"
presented
by
actual

I-II, Q. 108, art. 1, at 1114, pt. I-II, Q. 108, art. 2, at 1115.
I-II, Q. 108, art. 2, at 1115.
Id. pt. I-II, Q. 108, art. 2, at 1116.

33 Id. pt.
34 Id. pt.
35
36

HENRI GRENIER, MORAL PHILOSOPHY 11 (1948) [hereinafter GRENIER, MORAL

PHILOSOPHY].
37 SUMMA THEOLOGJAE, supra note 13, pt. I-II, Q. 108, art. 2, at 1115, pt. I-II,

Q.

108, art. 3, at 1117.
38 See McCall, The Architecture of Law, supra note 1, at 57-60 (explaining that
Eternal Law as Divine Wisdom emphasized its rationality, and the act of
promulgation emphasized the volitional nature).
39 Id. at 85.
40 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13.
41 Id. pt. I-II, Q. 91, art. 3, at 998.
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circumstances of human existence.42 Gratian's Decretum also
recognizes the connection between reason and human law. 43 He
includes a text explaining that "reason ... supports [human
laws]"'-legem ratio commendat, and ordinances "[will be]
determined by reason" and therefore ordinances are "all that
reason has already confirmed"-lex erit omne iam quod ratione

constiterit."
Yet, the relationship of human law to reason also involves a
relation to Eternal Law. St. Thomas Aquinas notes that Eternal
Law, as the complete ordering of the universe, contains within it
"each single truth" including "the particular determinations of
individual cases." 4 This phrase easily can be misunderstood to
mean that all particular human laws have already been
formulated in the Eternal Law and human law must merely
discover and conform to them. This conclusion would be similar
to Ronald Dworkin's argument that there are "right answers" to
all legal questions.46 Such a conclusion is an oversimplification of
the concept of the Eternal Law and human participation in it. To
draw the distinction, it is important to examine this statement in
context:
The human reason cannot have a full participation of the
dictate of the Divine Reason, but according to its own mode, and
imperfectly. Consequently, as on the part of the speculative
reason, by a natural participation of Divine Wisdom, there is in
us the knowledge of certain general principles, but not proper
knowledge of each single truth, such as that contained in the
Divine Wisdom; so too, on the part of the practical reason, man
has a natural participation of the eternal law, according to
certain general principles, but not as regards the particular
determinations of individual cases, which are, however,
contained in the eternal law. Hence the need
for human reason
47
to proceed further to sanction them by law.

42

Id.

See GRATIAN, THE TREATISE ON LAWS WITH THE ORDINARY GLOSS D. 1, C. 5
(Augustine Thompson trans., The Catholic Univ. of America Press 1993) [hereinafter
4

GRATIAN, DECRETUM].
4 Id.
45 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-Il, Q. 91, art. 3, at 998.

" Rebecca L. Brown, How Constitutional Theory Found Its Soul: The
Contributions of Ronald Dworkin, in EXPLORING LAW'S EMPIRE: THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF RONALD DWORKIN 42 (Scott Hershovitz ed., 2006).
47 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-II, Q. 91, art. 3, at 998.
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The phrases Divine Reason and Divine Wisdom preceding
the reference to Eternal Law recall the connection between the
knowledge of God and the Eternal Law that is critical for St.
Thomas Aquinas. 4 The Eternal Law establishes the nature of
things and the ends to which those things are directed. Yet,
these general principles also contain within them the particular
actions determined by those ends just as a conclusion is said to
be contained in the premises.4 9 Yet, God has in the case of
humans permitted the participation of human reason in the
formation of those particular determinations. The particular
shape these determinations will take is dependent both upon the
type, or exemplar, of Eternal Law, and instrumentally on the
practical reason of human beings participating in making
particular determinations of the general principles. 50 Human
lawmaking is a participation in the Eternal Law in the sense
that human laws are meant to be derived from the general
principles of Eternal Law made known through Natural Law. 5'
To the extent these particular determinations are reasonable
determinations in harmony with the established ends, they are
contained within Eternal Law in two different ways. First, they
are contained in the general principles just as a particular work
of art following a style is contained in the exemplar of that style.52
Likewise, more than one conclusion can be contained in a major
premise depending upon the contingent minor premise selected. 3
Taking the major premise that "Man is a rational animal," we
can show that both of the conclusions--"John Smith is a rational
animal" and "Mary Jones is a rational animal"-are contained in
the major premise. This is because both minor premises---"John

" See McCall, The Architecture of Law, supra note 1, at 57-59.
49 HENRI GRENIER, GENERAL INTRODUCTION, LOGIC, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE 78

(J.P.E. O'Hanley trans., 1948) [hereinafter GRENIER, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE).
o See McCall, The Architecture of Law, supra note 1, at 59.
51 SUMMA

THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-I, Q. 93, art. 1, at 1003; see also

III-11, ch. 123, at 116
(English Dominican Fathers trans., Benziger Bros. 1928) ("Now positive laws should
SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES pt.

be based on natural instinct, [oportet quod ex naturaliinstinctu procedant] if they be
human: even as in demonstrative sciences, all human discoveries must needs be

founded on principles naturally known. And if they be divine, not only do they
express the instinct of nature, but they also supply the defect of natural instinct:
even as the things that God reveals, are beyond the grasp of natural reason.").
52 See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-I,
Q. 93, art. 1, at 1003.
"' See W. D. Ross, Introduction to ARISTOTLE'S PRIOR AND POSTERIOR
ANALYTICS 1, 4 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
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Smith is a Man" and "Mary Jones is a Man"-can be paired with
this major premise. Although both conclusions are contained in
the major premise, the particular conclusion to a given syllogism
is contingent upon the selection of the minor premise. "
Secondly, Divine Wisdom, knowing all things, knows the
particular determinations
that will in fact be made
instrumentally by the human laws.55
This foreknowledge,
however, is denied to Man so that he may participate in the
lawmaking process by using his reason and not divine revelation
to make those determinations.5 6
It is this element of
participation in lawmaking that distinguishes the process of
lawmaking from a mechanical discovery of particular human
laws that already exist, which need merely be made known by
the promulgation of human laws.5 7 If this were all that occurred,
human laws would only participate in one aspect of lawmakingpromulgation. By contrast, the rules governing the operation of
non-rational creatures already exist in particular determinations.
For example, dropping something causes it to fall by virtue of
gravity. Man does not participate in formulating this law in the
same way he does with respect to laws of human action."
He
merely discovers its operation and attempts to understand its
causes. As to laws governing human actions, Man is charged
with the task of not only discovering, but also determining the
rule's details according to the general principles implanted in
Man's reason through the Natural Law.59 At the same time that
God permits this active participation, the Divine Wisdom already
knows the determination that will be made.
Yet, this participation in lawmaking God has granted is not
a "full participation of the dictate of the Divine Reason," but only
"a natural participation of Divine Wisdom [source of Eternal
Law]" consisting of "a natural participation of the eternal law,

-

See GRENIER, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, supra note 49, at 81-83 (describing

major and minor premises and their relation to conclusions using categorical
syllogism, but employing slightly different terminology).
55 See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-I, Q. 91, art. 3, at 998.
6 See Mark C. Modak-Truran, Beyond Theocracy and Secularism (Part I):
Toward a New Paradigmfor Law and Religion, 27 MiSs. C. L. REV. 159, 168 (2007).
17 See McCall, The Architecture of Law, supra note 1, at 53.
5 See Martin Rhonheimer, Natural Law as a "Work of Reason": Understanding
the Metaphysics of ParticipatedTheonomy, 55 AM. J. JURIS. 41, 69 (2010).
59 See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-II, Q. 91, art. 3, at 998.
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according to certain general principles."" Thus, we can know
that there exist objectively true determinations of individual
cases, contained within the Divine Wisdom or Eternal Law, but
our knowledge of these singular truths is not "natural." Unlike
the general principles of the Natural Law which are "impressed
on it [our reason] by nature"6 or "imparted to us by nature,"6 2 the
particular determinations are arrived at by the "efforts of
reason"--industriam rationis."
Making these particular
determinations involves work or industry. It is not something
that we know like a proposition per se nota, which once explained
is easily grasped by the mind. 4 This difficulty of making
determinations in individual cases further explains the need for
human laws. Because making these particular determinations is
hard work for each individual accompanied by a significant risk
of error, and hence confusion, 65 there is a need for human law to
"sanction" particular determinations.6 6
Not all of these
sanctioned determinations will be perfectly contained within the
Eternal Law, in the sense of being perfect determinations
although they are contained in the sense of being foreknown by
God. The error is not an error in God but rather in the weakness
of human reason. It is not an error in God but rather tolerated
by Him as a consequence of permitting human, fallible
participation in the lawmaking process for human action. 7
Understanding the imperfect nature of Man's participation
helps to explain why St. Thomas Aquinas argued for the limited
jurisdiction of lawmaking by constituted authorities. 8 Not all
rules of human action are to be determined by legal authorities.
As noted supra, some are left to individuals and others to
personal superiors. What marks the jurisdictional boundary of
the determinations to be made by communal, as opposed to
personal, superiors? The answer is contained in our prior
The
discussion-those touching upon the "common good."

0 Id.
61

Id.

62

Id. pt. I-II, Q. 91, art. 3, at 997.

63

Id.

6

See id. pt. I-II, Q. 94, art. 2, at 1009.
See McCall, The Divine Law, supra note 7, at 122.
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-II, Q. 91, art. 3, at 998.

67

See JOHN RZIHA, PERFECTING HUMAN ACTIONS: ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON

64
65

HUMAN PARTICIPATION IN ETERNAL LAW 217 (2009).
68 See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-Il, Q. 108, art. 2, at 1115-16.
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definition of law according to St. Thomas Aquinas includes a
dictate of reason oriented to the common good. 69 A text from
Isidore contained in the Decretum exemplifies this limitation on
human law. He says: "Furthermore, if ordinance is determined
by reason, then ordinance will be all that reason has already
confirmed-all, at least, that is congruent with religion,
consistent with discipline, and helpful for salvation."7
Notice,
human law (ordinance) is not all that reason has confirmed but
that which is related to a phrase that summarizes the
supernatural and natural common good of Man: religion,
discipline, and salvation. St. Thomas Aquinas uses another
phrase to encapsulate the common good sought by human law:
peace within the community and attainment of individual habits
of virtue of its members. 71
Thus, human laws should not
determine all actions, but only those related to the common good.
Why is the sanction of human law better than each deciding
for himself between all the individual choices of action presented
in life? The answer to this question depends on the volitional
aspect of lawmaking. In addition to being consistent with reason,
status as a law requires that a volitional choice of the will be
made and promulgated." An act of the will is necessary because
the common good requires it. Decisions affecting the common
good should not be left to individual choice because, as they
involve contingent matters, there may be more than one
reasonable way of determining them.73 Reason may not be
enough to determine the precise choice, as reason may provide
for a number of reasonable alternatives. Hence each individual
would be a law unto himself, with the result that the order of
civil society would be harmed or destroyed. Civil society is a
heterogeneous organism that attains only a unity of order. This
fact means that members of society have individual ends that
they pursue that require coordination to the heterogeneous
society's common end.74 Such coordination requires that choices

" See id. pt. I-II, Q. 90, art. 2, at 994.
70

GRATIAN, DECRETUM, supra note 43.

See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-11, Q. 95, art. 1, at 1013-14.
See id. pt. I-II, Q.90, art. 4, at 995.
11 See id. pt. I-Il, Q. 95, art. 3, at 1015-16.
14 See GRENIER, MORAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 36, at 290.
"

72
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be made by an authority and followed by the members, so as to
preserve the unity of order that is necessary to attain the
common good.7"
An example will aid in understanding this argument.
Natural Law contains the precept to preserve human life.76 In
the course of pursuing their individual end, people operate
vehicles capable of killing innocent human beings. Easily we can
conclude the principle that cars should be driven in a safe and
orderly manner so as to avoid killing innocent people. A more
particular conclusion flowing from this general conclusion is that
cars traveling in the same direction should travel on the same
portion of the road so as not to collide with those traveling in the
opposite direction. All of these deductions can be reached by
merely applying rules of practical reason.
Yet, the final
conclusion still does not tell the driver on which side to drive
when going north on a particular road. Should it be the right
side or the left side? The principle permits either; there is no
inherently more reasonable side to choose. We thus reach a point
where humans must make a volitional choice between two
reasonable determinations. A choice must be made to preserve
that aspect of the common good called orderly safety; it must not
be determined by each individual driver as they would be capable
of determining rationally different sides from one another.
Hence, a volitional act of an authority must bring a unity of order
to the individual ends pursued by drivers by definitively choosing
right or left for the community. This example demonstrates a
case for necessitating the formation of a law, in the proper sense
of the term, in contrast to individual determination. The
common good requires a legal determination of the Natural Law
principle by the authority with interests in the care of the
community. Once selected, driving on the side not selected by
the legal authority now would violate the Natural Law precept to
preserve life.
One of Jean Porter's greatest contributions to contemporary
Natural Law theory has been to reemphasize the underdetermination of Natural Law, the principles of which allow for a
Given the
variety of specific contingent determinations.77
7, See id. at 289-90, 367-68.
76 See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-II, Q. 94, art. 2, at 1009.
71 See, e.g., PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW, supra note 9, at 81-82, 221-22.
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contingency of matter to which precepts of Natural Law are
applied, the precepts do not automatically determine a particular
choice, such as the left or right side of the road. There is a realm
of choice which must be made by an authority with care of the
community. Even though Natural Law precepts foreclose some
choices, such as a law requiring people to drive into oncoming
traffic, they leave choices, often broader than the binary one in
the traffic law example, to be made by authorities as a
participation in the Eternal Law.78
This under-determination by Natural Law does not mean
that Natural Law and human law's determinations of it lack the
quality of truth.
As St. Thomas Aquinas explains, the
correspondence constituting truth differs for speculative and
practical matters.7 9 For speculative matters this correspondence
is "conformity between the intellect and the thing." °
For
practical matters it is the "conformity with right appetite."8 1 The
difference is that speculative knowledge is oriented to necessary
things whereas practical matters are oriented to contingent
things, choices of action that could be other than they are. 2 The
end of actions, or the goods to be obtained, are determined by
nature and thus cannot be chosen to be good but only willed or
desired as such. 3 The means to attain these goods or ends,
however, can be the object of a real human choice because they
are contingent.'M The choice of the right side could have been the
left side (and in fact is in other countries than ours). But it is
still a true choice: The choice corresponds to a right appetite, the
willing of a contingency that truly conforms to a good-safe
travel on the roads. Since necessary things cannot be but what
they are, there can only be one true speculative judgment-this
particular shape is a circle. Yet, because human actions as
means are contingent-different choices can all correspond to a
78 See id. at 80-81.
79 See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, COMMENTARY ON THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk.
VI, lec. II: cmts. 1127-32 (C. I. Litzinger trans., Henry Regnery Co. 1964)
[hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS]; SUMMA THEOLOGIAE,
supra note 13, pt. I-II, Q. 57, art. 5, at 832.
80 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-II, Q. 57, art. 5, at 832.
81 Id.
82

See id.

m COMMENTARY ON THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 79, at bk. III, lec. V:
cmt. 446.

' Id. at bk. III, lec. V: cmt. 446, bk. III, lec. IX: cmt. 487, bk. III, lec. XI: cmt.
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right appetite for the good-there can be more than one true
practical judgment. s5 Either the right or the left side could be a
true judgment because either can correspond to willing the good
of orderly and safe driving. These practical judgments are
choices of intermediate-as opposed to ultimate-ends, or a
choice of means, so this conclusion is consistent with the reality
that there may be more than one means to the same end. 6 If the
judgment to be made were whether travel should be safe or
unnecessarily dangerous, this would be a speculative judgment
with only one possible answer, safe.
This traffic law example also demonstrates why some
particular determinations or choices of means must be made by
human law rather than left to individual determination. Those
individual acts whose nature requires coordination to the
common good need to be determined by individuals having
"spiritual or temporal charge of others." 7 Everyone choosing for
themselves would create dangerous chaos. Yet, the requirement
for a communal determination in some circumstances does not
mandate that all choices should be determined by one in a
superior position in our community.
On the other side of the coin are the actions intrinsically tied
to the personal good but remote to the common good. 88 As a
result of the remoteness to the common good, these choices are
left to private individuals. Human law may justly regulate the
manner in which these individual choices are lived out in the
community and affect the common good, but the choice itself is
left to the individual.8 9 For example, an individual's choice of
profession or career is one primarily oriented to his personal
good. Natural Law principles will provide the boundaries for this
choice by, for example, foreclosing the choice of being a
professional mass murderer. Yet, the particular determination
within the range permitted by Natural Law is rightly left to
individual determination. Prior to making this determination
and to prepare for it, some education must be provided. This
decision again affects more directly the individual good of the
85 Id. at bk. III, lec. V: cmt. 446, bk. III, lec. VI: cmt. 452.
8 See id. at bk. VI, lec. II: cmt. 1131 (explaining that ends are determined by
nature but means are left to the choice of Men).
87 SUMMA THEOLOGLAE, supra note 13, pt. I-I, Q. 108, art. 2, at 1116.
88 See GRENIER, MORAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 36, at 288, 367.

89 See id. at 289, 368.
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person and should be made by his personal superior, such as his
parent, who is charged with making determinations affecting his
personal good on his behalf. Yet, once the choice of career is
made, the legal authority in a community may have promulgated
laws regarding the way this choice is lived out in the community.
For example, a civil authority may determine the level of
knowledge and skill which must be demonstrated before someone
choosing to be a doctor can begin treating other members of the
community. The choice of individual profession is an individual
determination; the determination of licensing for publicly
carrying out that profession is rightly reserved to the authority
caring for the community.
Marriage presents another example. The law would wrongly
exercise authority to determine that an individual must marry or
must marry a particular spouse. Yet, the requirements of form to
enter into a legal marriage, once chosen, and the public
consequences of that choice in terms of property, for example, are
determinations properly to be made in conformity to the precepts
of Natural Law by those having "spiritual or temporal charge of
others."90
As a natural lawyer, St. Thomas Aquinas is admittedly
idealistic (he argues for the existence of an objective truth in
practical matters), but he balances this idealism with a healthy
practicality. 1 Truth is the correspondence of a chosen means to a
truly desirable good.
Multiple choices of means may all
correspond truly with a given objective, which allows for a
variety of legal systems making different but all true choices. A
worldwide harmonized legal system is not necessary for law to be
true. Further, even the wise can err, and we need not be
scandalized by this fact. In reality, no legal system will always
be perfect. In other words, each particular determination of a
given legal system may not be a correct correspondence to the
proper ends under every circumstance. It is sufficient for human
societal well-being that the wise get particular determinations as
correct as is possible given their abilities. Some error in the
system is inevitable and does not undermine the legitimacy of the
entire system. Ultimately, as God has withdrawn from direct
legislation for Man after the promulgation of the New Law, He

90 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-I, Q. 108, art. 2, at 1116.
"' See id. pt. I-I, Q. 57, art. 5, at 832.
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wills the temporal and spiritual leaders, who may not in fact
even be wise, to do their best in reaching particular
determinations.
Human lawmaking thus involves both an act of the intellect
and the will. 92 Human laws must conform to the Divine Wisdom
of Eternal Law as known through the principles of Natural and
Divine Law. The Natural Law does put constraints on the
content of human law. As Jean Porter observes:
[Tihe canonists and theologians do consider the natural law to
have direct moral and social implications, even in human
society as it now exists. It is true that for them, as well as for
the civilians, the natural law must be expressed through human
conventions in order to have practical force in the present
historical order. Nonetheless, they also believe that the natural
law places definite moral constraints on the legitimate forms of
institutional life ..

.

Even within these constraints and under certain
circumstances, the principles of Natural Law permit real human
choices, some of which must be made for a community. The
following Subsection will address these determinations more
closely and consider their source and the process that produces
the choice of the will in light of principles of reason.
B.

The Processes and Sources of Human Lawmaking

The prior Subsection explored the nature and purpose of
human law as the process of rationally making particular
determinations of Natural Law's general precepts, which are
necessary to promote the common good. For Gratian and St.
Thomas Aquinas, the Natural Law must serve as the framework
onto which particular human laws are added. Gratian expresses
this dependence by explaining that human laws are constituted
by, confirmed by, or stand with reason." St. Thomas Aquinas
explains the relation thus: "[Elvery human law has just so much
of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature."95 In
other words, human law's character as law is a product of its
derivation from Natural Law. This Subsection will examine the
dialectical process of working out this derivation. The process
92

See id. pt. I-II, Q. 57, art. 6, at 832.

93 PORTER, NATURAL AND DMNE LAW, supra note 14, at 250.
94 GRATIAN, DECRETUM, supra note 43.
95

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-II, Q. 95, art. 2, at 1014.
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involves two stages of intellectual activity. First, there are
human laws that belong to the "law of nations" (jus gentiurm) and
secondly, to the "civil law" of a particular people, or the jus
civile.9 6
The first set of human laws contains "those things which are
derived from the law of nature, as conclusions from premises."97
These are general principles of law deduced directly from the
speculative knowledge of the end of Man. They have become
general principles underlying various legal systems, operating in
the absence of the legal system's particular determination. St.
Thomas Aquinas provides as an example the conclusion that
buying and selling should be on just terms, because just
commercial activity, "without which men [could not] live
together," is necessary as Man must live together as "a social
animal. 98 Thus the general law of nations contains a principle
that exchange transactions should be just. The civil law of a
particular community, on the other hand, contains more
particular laws "which are derived from the law of nature by way
of particular determination." 99
These laws are particular
determinations of what constitutes just exchange, such as the
particular scope of factual misrepresentation that will render an
exchange transaction unjust and unenforceable by a particular
community's court system. 100
St. Thomas Aquinas also proffers an example of the
relationship between jus gentium and jus civile. The jus gentium
contains a conclusion that "evil-doer[s] should be punished." 101
In contrast, the jus civile contains a law requiring that an evildoer "be punished in this or that way. ' Roman law provides an
example illustrating the use of the jus gentium. The particular
0 3
law of Rome (the jus civile) was not applicable to non-Romans.
Yet as Rome's power spread beyond its original territory,
disputes arose involving non-Roman citizens. In 247 B.C., the
position of a second Praetor, Praetor Peregrinus, was created to
9' Id. pt. I-II, Q. 95, art. 4, at 1016.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
109

See id.

101 Id. pt.
102

I-II, Q. 95, art. 2, at 1015.

Id.

10 WILLIAM L. BURDICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAw AND THEIR RELATION
TO MODERN LAW 198 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2004).
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decide cases involving non-Romans applying not the jus civile,
but the principles of thejus gentium, to reach judgment. 10 4 Since
the jus civile was inapplicable, this Praetor used the universal
principles of the jus gentium to render particular judgments. 1 5
With this distinction between jus gentium and jus civile in mind,
we can now turn our attention to the process by which human
law moves from the general precepts of the Natural Law, to the
universal principles of the jus gentium, to the particular
determinations of various legal systems.
Cicero is one of the earliest authors to describe this process
of translating principles of Natural Law into laws of particular
peoples. 10 6 He summarizes the process thus10 7:

Justice is a habit (habitus) of the mind which attributes its
proper dignity to everything, preserving a due regard to the
general welfare. Its first principles proceed from nature (ab
nature). Afterwards certain things come into common usage (in
consuetudinem) due to the reasonableness of their utility;
afterwards, the fear of both the laws (legum) and religion
sanctioned these things [for example, the things that have been
adopted as part of common usages], both having been
established by nature (ab natura) and having been approved by
common usage (ab consuetudine).
Law by common usages (consuetudine jus'08 ) is that which
either, having been drawn out of nature quietly, use (usus) has
nourished and made great, like religion; or, if we see preserved
any of those things which we have already spoken of as having
been produced by nature and made stronger by common usage
(consuetudine) or, that which antiquity has carried through into
custom (morem) by the approval of the common people: such as
a covenant that has been made, fairness, and cases which have
already been decided. A covenant is that which is agreed upon
between some people; fairness is that which is equitable in all
cases; a case previously decided concerns that which is already

104See id. at 105, 200.
Id. at 200.
106 CICERO, ON THE COMMONWEALTH AND ON THE LAws xxiv (James E. G. Zetzel
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999) [hereinafter CICERO, ON THE COMMONWEALTH].
107 The following is a slightly adjusted translation of the original source.
108 Consuetudine being the ablative of cause expresses the cause or reason of a
'o5

thing. Thus, this sentence describes law caused by common usages. ROBERT J.

HENLE, LATIN GRAMMAR 178 (1958) ("The ablative without a preposition may also be
used to express the CAUSE OR REASON (ABLATIVE OF CAUSE)."). Id. at 320.
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decreed by the opinions of some person or persons. Law by
statute (Lege ius0 9 ) is contained in that which is in writing
which is made known to the people in order that it might be
observed. 1 °
There are several key concepts contained in this passage:
justice (justitia), nature (natura), usages (consuetudine or usus),
custom (mos), and law (jus), which can be caused by common
usages (consuetudine) or by written ordinances (lege). The
beginning of human law (jus) is justice.'
Justice has its origin
in nature. Eventually this natural justice is formulated into law
either in the form of law by customs (law caused by usages) or
written statutes (law caused by written laws).'12 Yet, Cicero's
explanation of the process helps to disabuse us of a notion that
has dominated Natural
Law jurisprudence
since the
Enlightenment.
When it is said that these principles are
deduced from nature, this phrase conjures images of a thinkersuch as Ren6 Descartes-interacting directly with abstract
principles and closed within the confines of his mind, where he
abstractly deduces more abstract principles.
Yet, Cicero
describes a more concrete process. Certain common practices
develop naturally because they appear useful."'
These
constitute the jus gentium-general principles of justice in
common usage. Over the course of time, some particularities of
these principles enter into the customs of a people, and
eventually these practices become sanctioned or confirmed by
long standing constant use. 4
Some of these longstanding
practices receive formal sanction by religion or the law: Recall
St. Thomas Aquinas's reference to spiritual or temporal
authorities.
Not all practices or usages become part of the law. Rather,
only those that are carried through time by longstanding
antiquity or which are confirmed by written statutes.

10"

110

The same ablative of cause is used. See id.
CICERO, DE INVENTIONE bk. II, ch. LIII-IV [hereinafter CICERO, DE

INVENTIONE], available at http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/cicero/inventione2.shtml
(author's translation).
"I SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. IH-I, Q. 57, art. 1, at 1431
(describing jus as "the just thing itself" (ipsam rem iustam)); see id. ("[J]us (right) is
so called because it is just Uustum].").
112 Id. pt. II, Q. 57, art. 1, at 106.
"3 CICERO, DE INVENTIONE, supra note 110, at bk. II, ch. LIV.
114

Id.
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Significantly, Cicero mentions no particular person engaging in
abstract deductions. These practices are drawn out of nature
quietly or softly (leviter). Thus, more particular principles of
Natural Law and their particular determinations within a
commonwealth are deduced, not scientifically by an abstract
thinker, but collectively over the course of time by the practices
of a people and the evaluation of those practices by religious and
legal authorities, periodically lending sanction to them. 115 In
many ways, this reading of Cicero corresponds to Professor Jean
Porter's understanding of how we interact with the Natural Law.
She explains that Natural Law principles are always mediated
through a particular culture. 116 The general propositions are not
encountered in the abstract but through their particular
instantiation in a legal culture. 117 For Medieval lawgivers, she
explains, "[Adjudication and even legislation presupposed a
basis of generally accepted norms and practices ...to provide
starting points and substance for new law.""' This does not
mean that philosophers and jurists did not formulate and
articulate abstract principles of the Natural Law and deductively
reason from them.
Yet, those abstract principles are first
encountered not in the abstract, but through some particular
legal culture or cultures." 9 As Professor Porter explains, "A
natural law analysis is directed towards identifying the natural
purposes served by a conventional practice or institution, with
the aim ...of rendering this practice intelligible as one aspect of
the 'unified set of goal-ordered capacities' that jointly inform
human existence." 2 °
Cicero would certainly agree with her characterization. He
contrasts the discussion of the best legal regime in his On the
Commonwealth to the more abstract discussion in Plato's
Republic.2 ' For this Roman philosopher, the best method of
discussing the philosophy of the commonwealth is by examining

115

See id.

116

See PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW, supra note 9, at 120.

17 See, e.g., id. at 115-22.
118

Id. at 50.

119See, e.g., id. at 105-13.
120

Id. at 117.

121 CICERO, ON THE COMMONWEALTH, supra note 106, at 34 ("I will have an

easier time in completing my task if I show you our commonwealth as it is born,
grows up, and comes of age, and as a strong and well-established state, than if I
make up some state as Socrates does in Plato." (emphasis added)).
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its actual instantiation in the history of the Roman Republic
rather than a theoretical construct of pure rationality as in
Republic.1 22 As Laelius observes during the discussion of Roman
history:
[We see that you have introduced a new kind of analysis,
something to be found nowhere in the writings of the
Greeks .... All the others wrote about the types and principles
of states without any specific model or form of commonwealth.
You seem to me to be doing both: from the outset, you have
preferred to attribute your own discoveries to others [for
example, Romulus and the other critical figures in the history of
Rome] rather than inventing it all yourself in the manner of
Plato's Socrates .... 123
This contrast in methodology is useful in understanding the
relationship between the general, rational principles of Natural
Law and actual human laws.
Rather than conceiving the
transition from Natural Law to human law as a purely
descending deductive process-starting with the first principle of
Natural Law from which general principles are deduced, from
which more specific principles are deduced and following which
particular legal determinations are made-the process is more
fluid.'2 4 Over the course of time, practices and usages come into
being to usefully address natural inclinations, some of which,
being reasonable, stand the test of time and become common.
From these practices, the inclinations 125 underlying them can be
discerned, and principles from them can be articulated. Once
formulated, these principles can be used to normatively evaluate
the same practices and customs to determine if they should be
strengthened and carried through time by acquiring legal
sanction. Such an inductive or deductive process of reasoning
involving both speculative and practical knowledge is similar to
the methodology for moral reasoning employed by St. Thomas

122

Thelma B. Degraff, Plato in Cicero, 35 CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY 143, 149

(1940).

See CICERO, ON THE COMMONWEALTH, supra note 106, at 39. In fairness to
the Greeks, Aristotle does employ a more historically rooted approach within his
theoretical treatment of politics by examining the history of certain cities. See
ARISTOTLE, Politica, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE bk. II, ch. 8-12 (Richard
McKeon ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., Random House 1941).
124 See CICERO, DE INVENTIONE, supra note 110.
125 See McCall, The Architecture of Law, supra note 1, at 47, 84 (discussing the
role of inclinations in the Natural Law).
123
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Aquinas, as described by Professor Maria T. Carl. 126 The result is
a dialectical process running from the particular instantiation of
a practice up to general principles induced from it, and running
back down to the particular practices to evaluate them. This
model of lawmaking also resembles Michael Moore's functionalist
jurisprudence. Moore argues that since law is a functional kind,
we come to know law by starting with a hypothesis about law's
structural
goal, which must then be tested by examining its
127
components so as finally to come to know law's goal.
Such a process also correlates to Alasdair MacIntyre's
important contribution to modern Thomistic Aristotelianism,
which emphasizes the same need for particular contexts in which
Thaddeus Kozinski
to understand universal principles. 28
succinctly explaines MacIntyre's concept of tradition-constituted
rationality thus: "Maclntyre insists that it is only through active
participation in particular authentic traditions that men are
rendered capable of discovering and achieving their ultimate
good; for, it is only through a particular tradition that we can
properly apprehend universal truth."12 9 MacIntyre explains that
for the Aristotelian or Thomistic tradition, ethics or moral
reasoning involves a dialectic process involving three points of
reference: (1) man-as-he-happens-to-be, which can be reflected in
and (3) man-as-hecustoms; (2) the precepts of the Natural Law;
130
could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature.
We can translate MacIntyre's epistemological claim into the
language of our current discussion. The universal principles of
the Natural Law can only be discovered and explored through a
particular community's determinations of human law, its
tradition. The universal and particular are both part of the
process.

126 Maria T. Carl, The First Principles of Natural Law: A Study of the Moral
Theories of Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas 124-30 (Dec. 1989) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Marquette University).
127 See Michael S. Moore, Law as a FunctionalKind, in NATURAL LAW THEORY:

CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 188, 208-09 (Robert P. George ed., 1992).
128 THADDEUS J. KoZINSKI, THE POLITICAL PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM
AND WHY PHILOSOPHERS CAN'T SOLVE IT 150-51 (2013).
129

Id. at 151.

130 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 53

of Notre Dame Press 2d ed. 1984).

(Univ.
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We can use the practice of enforcing contacts (pactum),
mentioned by Cicero, as an example of this process.' 3 ' Over time
a community requires the fulfillment of certain promises, called
contracts in the American legal tradition.'3 2 By examining this
practice we can conclude that the peace and efficiency of human
society depend to some extent upon the practice of enforcing
certain promises. This requirement can be seen as an inclination
related to Man's social nature. To live in society and work on
projects jointly, people need to depend upon-be justified in
relying on-the commitments of others. It is therefore unjust to
break a pact. Yet, we can observe that the practice does not
universally enforce all promises. For example, in the American
legal tradition, promises made under duress, 133 promises made
for no consideration, 3 4 promises made pursuant to a mistake,'
or promises whose enforcement would be unconscionable 136 may
not be enforced. We can determine if a particular promise should
be enforced according to the common practice by comparing the
particular promise that someone seeks to enforce to contracts
that longstanding practice has enforced, in light of the general
principles related to Man's social nature as discerned by
examining this practice.
Lawyers, philosophers, and theologians in the Natural Law
tradition took the institution of private property as another
example of this dialectical relationship between societal
conventions and Natural Law principles.3 7 The legal forms for
the creation, transfer, and inheritance of property are developed
through communal customs. Yet, these forms are constrained by
Natural Law principles such as the Decalogue precept
138
prohibiting theft.
Roman law provides another example of this important
relationship between Natural Law and the customs of particular
communities. By declining to apply the law of the city of Rome,

131 Jean Porter uses the example of the institution of marriage for a similar
illustration. See, e.g., PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW, supra note 9, at 117.
131 See 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 1 (2013).
133 81A C.J.S. Specific Performance § 42 (2013).
134 Id. § 35.
135 Id. § 40.
131 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 3 (2013).
137

See PORTER, NATURAL AND DIVINE LAW, supra note 14, at 251.

138 See id.
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the jus civile, to non-Roman citizens,'3 9 the Praetor Peregrinus
customary
Roman
particular
that
the
acknowledged
instantiation of Natural Law was not applicable to other peoples
not part of that tradition. In the absence of the applicable
particular jus civile, the Praetor Peregrinus had to abstract from
common usages the principles of jus gentium to decide cases.14 °
This law of nations appears to function as a type of law that
resides between Natural Law and the human laws of a particular
people. It resembles Natural Law precepts in that its rules are
general; it resembles the particular law of a nation in that its
principles are derived from the study of common practices of all
nations.14 ' Justinian's Institutes define it thus: "[TIhe law which
natural reason has established among all mankind and which is
the Law of Nations,
equally observed among all peoples, is called1 42
as being that which all nations make use of."
The jus gentium appears similar to Natural Law as it is
established by natural reason. Yet, it includes more than general
abstract principles; these principles have been in fact observed by
different nations in their formulation and administration of their
law. In a certain sense, the jus gentium looks to a broader
definition of customs than the application of a particular people's
law. It looks to the entire human race to discern common
principles across legal systems, which in varying contexts have
been derived by the use of reason from the principles of the
Natural Law.4 3 Yet, as the Praetor Peregrinus decided cases
under the jus gentium, common usages and practices started to
develop. The jus gentium is thus gradually determined into a
new communal set of practices: the jus gentium as applied to
non-Roman citizens. Unlike Natural Law, which remains at the
level of more or less general principles, within the system of
Roman law the jus gentium becomes a new communal tradition,
a body of more particular rules developed over time through
particular case decisions. For present purposes, the creation of
the Praetor Peregrinus and the development of a distinct
category of Roman positive law applicable to non-Romans based
1'9 See BURDICK, supra note 103, at 105, 200.
140 See id.
141 F. S. C. Northrop, Naturalisticand CulturalFoundationsfor a More Effective
InternationalLaw, 59 YALE L.J. 1430, 1435 (1950).
142 JustinianInstitutes, in 2 THE CML LAW 3, 6 (The Central Trust Co. 1932).
143 Northrop, supra note 141.

20141

DECORATING THE STRUCTURE

on the jus gentium demonstrate that the particularity of
communal customary practices was critical to the development of
law by Roman jurists. Abstract principles were insufficient;
concrete customary practices needed to be examined. It would be
inappropriate to apply Roman customary law to non-Romans,
and thus a broader examination of human custom was necessary,
leading to the development of a more particular legal tradition
based on the Natural Law principles reflected in the jus gentium.
Yet within both the jus civile and the jus gentium, not all
144
practices become part of the law, as Cicero himself observed.
The process involves both historical repetition and particular
rational evaluation. Cicero's definition of justice, which opened
this Subsection, 145 contains another concept which can help us
understand better how certain longstanding practices become
part of the law. Justice is defined as a habit. 1 46 A habit consists
of a repetition of certain actions that become part of our
nature.147 Aristotle explains that virtue is instilled by good
habits-the repetition of virtuous acts. 1 48 As the virtue of justice
is instilled in an individual by the habitual performance of
virtuous acts, so too communities acquire the virtue of justicethe object of law (jus)-by longstanding customs, which become
149
virtuous customs.
St. Thomas Aquinas explains that in Greek and Latin the
words ethics and morality (the study of human actions) are
related to the word for customs. 150
Just as an individual
develops virtues by repeated human actions or habits, likewise
the community develops its law by repeated human actions or
See CICERO, DE INVENTIONE, supra note 110.
supra Part I.B.
146 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-I, Q. 58, art. 1, at 1435.
147 See MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, The Second Book of the Rhetoric, or of the
Treatise on Rhetorical Invention, of M. T. Cicero, in ORATIONS VOL. 4: THE
144

145 See

FOURTEEN ORATIONS AGAINST MARCUS ANTONIUS; TO WHICH ARE APPENDED THE
TREATISE ON RHETORICAL INVENTION; THE ORATOR; TOPICS; ON RHETORICAL
PARTITIONS, ETC. 373-74 (G. Bell and Sons 1913-1921).
148 COMMENTARY ON THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 79, at bk. V, lec. II:

cmts. 908-12.
149 See PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW, supra note 9, at 139 ("[Culture]
represents, therefore, a kind of social analogue to the Aristotelian and Thomistic
idea of virtue as habitus ....
").
"0 COMMENTARY ON THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 79, at bk. II, lec. I:
cmt. 247 (explaining that in Greek ethos when spelled with an epsilon means moral
virtue or habit, but when spelled with an eta means custom and that the Latin
words mos and moris contain both meanings of habit and custom).
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customs. 151 If the customs are good, its law will attain its end,
which is justice. Similarly, a person possessing good habits will
attain his end, which is virtue. 152 But habits can be good or bad;
and bad habits produce vices, not virtues. 5 3 Not all habits are
good, and individuals must rationally review their habitual
actions to root out bad habits and instill good ones. Aristotle and
St. Thomas Aquinas analogize to the arts and explain that this is
why builders need a teacher to guide them to build well or else
they will become bad builders through the habit of building
poorly. 154 Just as those learning the art of building need a
teacher to guide the development of their habit, the community
needs an authority to guide the development of usages. This
analogy will assist in understanding the relationship between the
two means of making law discussed by Cicero--law by usages
and law by statute (consuetudinejusand legejus).
To understand this relationship between communal usages
and written statutes, we turn to Gratian. He begins his treatise
on canon law by emphasizing that human actions are governed
both by laws made by God and laws made by humans. 155 The
laws made by God include the Natural Law. 5 6 Gratian defines
the laws made by humans as the longstanding customs (mores)
"drawn up in writing and passed on as law." 57 He offers a
somewhat confusing definition of custom (mos): Longstanding
custom (mos) is long usages (consuetudo) simply handed on from
customs (moribus)158 The gloss identifies the confusing nature of
this definition in that the word mos appears in the definition of
itself. The gloss resolves this ambiguity by suggesting three
different meanings for custom (mos), customs (moribus), and
usage (consuetudo). Custom (Mos) means unwritten law (iure
non scripta).5 9 Usage (consuetudo) means "law [iure] whether
written or unwritten." 60 Customs (moribus) means "frequently

"I See id. at bk. V, lec. 2: cmts. 902-03.
152

Id. at bk. V, lec. II: cmts. 909-11.

153See id. at bk. II, lec. II: cmts. 260-64.
15 See id. at bk. II, lec. I: cmt. 250.
155 See McCall, The Architecture of Law, supra note 1, at 54 (citing GRATIAN,
DECRETUM, supra note 43, at D. 1).
156

Id. at 93.

157 GRATIAN, DECRETUM, supra note 43, at D. 1, C. 1.

Il Id. at D. 1, C. 4 ("Mos est longa consuetudo, de moribus tantummodo
tracta.").
159 Id.
160 Id.
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performed human actions. "16
Thus, not all moribus, or
frequently
performed
human
actions,
become
usages
(consuetudino). Those that do are either written (jure scripta) or
unwritten (mos). Once a certain common practice moves from
mere repeated actions to law, it can either take the form of a
statute or an unwritten customary law. 162 Before examining the
relationship between written and unwritten law, we will first
consider how the multitude of customs are sifted to become or
remain law.
Pope Nicholas declared that evil custom must be "torn up by
its roots."'63 Those vested with care of the common good, those
possessing legal authority, are to tear up evil customs by
enacting written laws prohibiting bad customs, just as bad habits
are to be driven out of a person by the guidance of a teacher.
Legislators must set aside customs if they conflict with truth or
reason.'
The example of chattel slavery in America presents a
case where a deeply rooted custom needed to be rooted out. 165 As
quoted by Gratian, Pope Nicholas provides:
An evil custom is no more to be tolerated than a dangerous
infection because, unless the custom is quickly torn up by its
roots, it will be adopted by wicked men as entitling them to a
privilege.
And then unchecked deviations and various
infractions will soon 1be
revered as lawful and honored as
66
immemorial privileges.
This rooting up must be done by legislation enacted by the
legal authorities.'6 7 "Let practice yield to authority; let ordinance
and reason vanquish bad practice." 6 ' It is ordinance and legal
161

Id.

162

Id. at D. 1,C. 5.

163

Id. at D. 8,C. 3.

64 See id. at D. 8, C. 4-C. 9.
165 See CHRISTOPHER A. FERRARA, LIBERTY, THE GOD THAT FAILED: POLICING
THE SACRED AND CONSTRUCTING THE MYTHS OF THE SECULAR STATE, FROM LOCKE

TO OBAMA 257 (2012) (arguing that slavery had become integrated in the customs of

the South and as Southerners themselves admitted could only be ended by being
rooted out and quoting John C. Calhoun as saying: "'We of the South cannot, will
not surrender our institutions. To maintain the existing relations between the two
races inhabiting that section of the Union is indispensible to the peace and
happiness of both. It cannot be subverted without drenching the country in
blood ....Be it good or bad, it has grown up among our society and institutions, it is
so interwoven among them that to destroy it is to destroy us as a people.' ").
166 GRATIAN, DECRETUM, supra note 43, at D. 8, C. 3.
167 See id. at D. 8, C. 3-C.5.
166 Id. at D. 11, C. 1.
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authority that accomplish this pruning action. Since it must be
"rooted up," it is not to be left to development by usages, but
rather definitively declared to be outside the law.
Even with respect to a law that overturns a practice, the law
is still connected to common practices. The development of the
practice has given rise to the definitive declaration by statute.
The pruning is guided by the Natural Law, which provides a
standard for determining which customs are evil, those that
conflict with truth or reason, terms which clearly refer to the
Natural Law as the rational participation in the Eternal Law,
the source of truth. 6 9 Although the normal disposition of legal
authority should be to respect longstanding practices and not to
interfere with them, 7 ° such respect does not extend to practices
that are contrary to Natural Law which should be "held null and
void." 7 ' St. Thomas Aquinas agrees that although human law,
including custom, is a rule and measure, it must itself be ruled
and measured by a higher law, Divine and Natural Law.' 72
The analogy to building is useful yet again. When a builder
paints an inside section of the house, he engages in a similar
process. He begins applying the paint, and then steps back
periodically to evaluate the result to determine if it correlates
well or poorly with the general intention. Does the color as
Does the
actually applied reflect the original intention?
thickness present the desired effect or is another coat of paint
required? The painter does not make such evaluations with
every paint stroke, but rather periodically evaluates his repeated
actions.
Before leaving this aspect of the relationship, it must be
emphasized that the ability of statute to reverse longstanding
customs should not be misunderstood as a plenary authority to
overturn customs at will. As noted, the normal position is that

9 Id. at D. 6, C. 3.
170

See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-I,

Q.

97, art. 3, at 1024 ("Sed

Contra,Augustine says (Ep. ad Casulan. xxxvi): 'The customs of God's people and the
institutions of our ancestors are to be considered as laws. And those who throw
contempt on the customs of the Church ought to be punished as those who disobey the
law of God.' ").
171 GRATIAN, DECRETUM, supra note 43, at D. 8 C. 1 (citing St. Augustine for the

proposition that custom must be abandoned if it is contradicted by the revelation of
God, or the Divine Law); see also id. at D. 1 C. 2.
172 See SUMMA THEOLOGLAE, supra note 13, pt. I-I, Q. 95, art. 3, at 1015.
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custom must be respected.1 73 The amount of respect due to a
custom, and hence the extent of the limitation on the legal
authorities' ability to tamper with it, is a function of its
relationship to Natural Law. If "truth supports custom, nothing
should be embraced more firmly."'7 4 The pruning is limited to
bad customs only.
The roles of custom and legislation are more complex than
statutes merely overturning bad customs. Sometimes statutes
175
restate in written form that which is already law by custom.
Recall that Cicero's historical explanation noted that practices
can become sanctioned by the written laws. Another purpose of
statutes can be to confirm or make more known the laws made by
custom. The earliest written collection of Roman law, the Twelve
Tables, was such a collection of customary Roman law written
down so that all subject to it could know its contents. 7 6 Written
law can perform two different functions-sanctioning or
1 77
confirming customs or abolishing bad customs.
Even those customs not confirmed by statute still carry the
force of law. The body of statutes is not coextensive with all of
human law.7 8 Custom having the force of law provides legal
answers to some questions not specifically addressed by statute.
"Custom [consuetudo] is a sort of law established by usages and
1 79
recognized as ordinance [lege] when ordinance [lex] is lacking."
Custom can thus supplement the written law by expanding its
application to broader contexts. In a gloss to this section, the
jurist, Johannes Teutonicus, cites several cases where custom
"has force against written law." 8 ' One of these examples is a
later causa in the Decretum, wherein an answer is provided to
the question of which clerics are bound to observe clerical

113 See BURDICK, supra note 103, at 183.
174 GRATIAN, DECRETUM, supra note 43, at

D. 8 C. 7.
Id. at D. 1 C. 5 ("It does not matter whether [custom] is confirmed by writing
or by reason, since reason also supports ordinances [lex].").
175

176 BURDICK, supra note 103, at 100.

15A C.J.S. Common Law § 16 (2013).
See GRATIAN, DECRETUM, supra note 43 ("[T]his shows that, in part, custom
[consuetudo] has been collected in writing, and, in part, it is preserved only in the
usages [moribus] of its followers. What is put in writing is called enactment or law
[ius], while what is not collected in writing is called by the general term 'custom'
[consuetudo].").
177
178

179 Id.
180

Id.
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celibacy.'
The causa references a written statute requiring only
bishops, priests, and deacons to observe clerical celibacy, but
concludes that clerics of other ranks are also obliged to observe
the church's custom (consuetudenem) of clerical celibacy, even
though not specifically subject to the statute.8 2 In this case, the
customary law supplements the specific ordinance applicable
only to the three highest classes of clerics.
St. Thomas Aquinas also explains that law can and is made
both by speech-statute, and action--customs. 8 3 To support this
conclusion, he uses an analogy to common experience. People
express practical judgments made in their mind both by speech
and by deeds. l ' 4 Analogously, a community can express its
rationally chosen law by written statutes and repeated deeds, or
through habitual customs.
The analysis thus far could suggest only a gap-filling
function for custom; it is law only when no statute addresses a
topic. If custom were limited to this role, it would be subordinate
to and at the mercy of enacted statutes. Individual passages
within the Decretum can be read to support this conclusion;
however, others seem to contradict it. The thirteenth-century
jurist Johannes Teutonicus observes that some authorities can be
cited to support the proposition that custom cannot judge
statutes and other authorities can be cited to support the
proposition that it can. 8 5
This apparent contradiction of
authorities can be seen as a necessary tension between custom
and written law within a legal system.
Denying absolute
controlling authority to one or the other allows for a continued
dialectical relationship between the two sources of law, by
statute and by custom. Since one function of statutes is to uproot
bad customs, statutes require a certain priority over custom.
Yet, written laws are, like customary laws, subject to evaluation
by a higher standard. 8 6 Like custom, they are also subordinate
181 Id. at

D. 32 C. 13.

182

See id.

1a

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-Il, Q. 97, art. 3, at 1024.
Id.
GRATIAN, DECRETUM, supra note 43 ("And so it may be argued that one is

184

185

never to judge according to custom if law prescribes the contrary ....

But much can

be found that is against this position.").
188 See id. at D. 8 C. 2 ("[N]atural law similarly prevails by dignity over custom
and enactments. So whatever has been either received in usages or set down in

writing is to be held null and void if it is contrary to natural law." (emphasis
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to Natural Law and must give way to it when they stand in
contradiction. According to Gratian, "[B]oth ecclesiastical and
secular enactments are to be rejected entirely if they are contrary
to natural law." 87 One method for overturning bad enactments
is the development of a practice abrogating them. Gratian
comments, "Some ordinances have now been abrogated by the
usage of those acting contrary to them because ordinances are
confirmed by the usages of those who observe them."118
St.
Thomas Aquinas agrees that an established contrary custom that
demonstrates why a previously enacted statute "is no longer
useful," can abrogate that statute "just as it might be declared by
the verbal promulgation of a law to the contrary."8 9
In a gloss on a later section of the Decretum, Johannes
Teutonicus returns to this question of customary practice
abrogating statutes. He compiles a list of criteria drawn from
various authorities that appear to circumscribe the precedence of
custom over enactment. The enumerated criteria include:
(1) the contrary custom must "gain force through the passage
of time";
(2) the custom must be "maintained by a contrary popular
judgment;"
(3) those maintaining the practice must do so "in the belief
that they are acting rightfully"
(4) and "with the intention of acting the same way in the
future";
(5) the object of the custom must be a matter with respect to
which "rights may change with the passage of time";190
(6) the custom must be "ancient and approved";

removed)); see also Kenneth Pennington, Politics in Western Jurisprudence,in 7 A
TREATISE OF PHILOSOPHY AND GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE: THE JURISTS' PHILOSOPHY

OF LAW FROM ROME TO THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 157, 163 (Andrea Padovcani &

Peter G. Stein eds., 2007) ("Under Gratian's schema, laws were not simply
reflections of different usages in various communities. All law had to be evaluated
according to standards that transcended human institutions.").
187

GRATIAN, DECRETUM, supra note 43, at D. 9 C. 11.

...Id. at D. 4 C. 3; see also Pennington, supra note 186.
189 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-II, Q. 97, art. 3, at 1024.
19o This phrase is a translation of the word praescriptibilis,which appears to be
a rarely used word. It could mean "capable of becoming a rule or precept" or "capable
of exception by prescription," which is an exception to law created by the passage of
time. The latter meaning seems appropriate in the context in that the custom may
be with respect to a matter that Divine and Natural Law leave to be determined by
human law.
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(7) the practice must "contain natural equity";
(8) its introduction must be "with the knowledge of the
prince and not merely tolerated" by him;
(9) the custom must not be introduced "through error"; and
(10) a "greater part of the people must be accustomed to the
use of this custom."1 91
Several important elements can be observed in this list.
First, the practice contrary to the statute must be in accord with
Natural Law: It must contain natural equity, and it must
concern a contingent matter left to determination by human law.
Secondly, the nature of time runs forward and backward from
the adoption of the statute. The statute must be one that is
overturning an ancient custom and the contrary practice must
continue for some time after enactment. The people must act
against the statute deliberately-the act is described as one of
exercising a judgment-which suggests they must have a real
knowledge of the statute and deliberately disregard it. The list is
a bit ambiguous about which "people" must be engaging in this
practice. It must be more than a mere majority of the people, but
it also appears that the government must be involved in some
way.19 2 The "prince" must to some extent approve of the
abrogation in that he must not merely tolerate the contrary
practice. The use of the word prince is somewhat ambiguous. It
may imply that the one who enacted the statute must consent to
its change by custom. On the other hand, not all legislation is by
the prince but sometimes by a legislative body, so it could suggest
the prince in exercising his executive or judicial capacity
disapproves of the enactment.
The key elements of the conditions can be distilled down to
two: The contrary practice must be (1) a deliberately chosen act
consistent with Natural Law which (2) sustains an ancient
practice of the community. Such is the summary conclusion
appended to this list by another jurist, Bartholomew of Brescia:
"Briefly ...it suffices.., that custom be reasonable and have
gained force through passage of time."1 93 The same jurist warns
the reader of the Decretum not to focus too literally on this list
but rather to focus on the principles of Natural Law and

DECRETUM, supra note 43, at D. 8 C. 7-C. 8 ("custom").
Id.
193 Id. at D. 8 C. 7 ("custom").
191 GRATIAN,
192
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antiquity when he states that "rational and long-standing custom
detracts from written law ....even if the other elements
mentioned by loan1 94 at D. 8 c. 7 are not present."1 95 A later
canonical source maintains the conclusion that customary
practices can take precedence over statutes, but only if they are
rational and legitimate. 196
The more detailed criteria of
Johannes Teutonicus can thus be seen as a way of expressing
cases in which these principles would be fulfilled in a way
maintaining a tension among the following: law and customary
practice, the people and their governors, natural reason and
particular determinations, and ancient and contemporary
usages.97
Beyond supporting the theoretical justification for customs
abrogating statutes, the Decretum also can be read to place
customary use within the legislative process itself. Gratian
introduces an example showing how a particular statute is not
part of the law due to a contrary use. He quotes a lengthy papal
ordinance mandating all clerics to fast from Quinquagesima
Sunday. Immediately following the quotation, Gratian asserts
that clerics cannot be held guilty for transgressing these statutes
"because they were not approved by common use." 19 The process
of written statutes entering into law involves more than adoption
by the legislator. Gratian describes a two-part process following
deliberation over a new written ordinance. "Ordinances are
instituted when they are promulgated; they are confirmed when
they have been approved by the usage of those who observe
them."'9 9 Institution of a statute is complete when the written
rule is made public and then a second phase begins: the rule's
confirmation by reception into common use.
Refusal of a
community to confirm a statute is curtailed by the conditions
described by Johannes Teutonicus, summarized as the contrary
200
practice must be rational and consistent with ancient custom.
The ability of common customs to abrogate a statute can be
understood to be embedded in the lawmaking process itself. In

194 loan is an abbreviation for Johannes Teutonicus.
195 GRATIAN, DECRETUM, supra note 43, at D. 1. C. 5 ("is lacking").
196 2 CORPUS JURIS CANONICI X 1.4.11 (1582).
197

Id.

199 GRATIAN, DECRETUM, supra note 43, at D. 4 C. 6.
199

Id.

200

Id.

at D. 4 C. 3 (emphasis removed).
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the language of H. L. A. Hart, part of the rule of recognition 0 1 is
confirmation by reception into practice. To form part of the
binding written law, a statute must be promulgated and then
confirmed by the practice of observing it. 20 2 The particular
ordinance concerning fasting from Quinquagesima Sunday is not
part of the law because it was never received into practice and
hence, never confirmed.
Thus, rather than custom and written law being in a static
one-way relationship wherein statute either confirms or
abolishes custom, they appear in a more fluid dialectical
relationship.2 3 Statutes and customs can supplement each other
by addressing cases different than or distinguishable from those
addressed by the other. Statutes can overturn bad customs, and
custom can abrogate statutes, in each case based on the higher
authority of the Natural and Divine Law. As Jean Porter has
explained, "His [Gratian's] point.., is that custom and ordinance
represent two distinct but interrelated ways of expressing the
demands of natural law in a particular time and place."20 4
Harold Berman has similarly described the medieval lawmaking
process as involving law coming up from the customs of the
people and coming down from the will of the legislator, by which
20 5
process "[1]aw helps to integrate the two."
Yet, the question still remains: Can a judge before whom a
case arises abolish a statute that conflicts with Natural Law, or
must it be enforced until changed by the legislator? 20 6 It would
seem that if a statute can be abrogated by custom, a judge can
refuse to enforce a statute that has been abrogated by contrary
practice. In this case, the judge is not abrogating a written

204

See generally H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94-107 (2d ed. 2012).
See id. at 94-95.
See id. at 95-96.
PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW, supra note 9, at 253 (emphasis added).

205

HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE

20
202
203

WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 557

(Harvard Univ. Press 1983).

This very question was at the center of one of the earliest Supreme Court
cases. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798). Justices Chase and Iredell clashed in
their opinions over whether the judiciary has the power to void legislation on
grounds of its violation of Natural Law. Compare id. at 388, with id. at 399 (Iredell,
J., concurring). Both justices agreed on the requirement that legislation must
comply with the Natural Law but differed over who held the power to abrogate
offending statutes. Id. Chase believed the power vested in the legislature, while
Iredell believed it vested in the judiciary. Id.; see also J. BUDZISZEWSKI, THE LINE
206

THROUGH THE HEART 151 (2011).
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ordinance, but rather enforcing the law (jus) in its totality, taking
into account that a contrary custom has either abrogated a
statute or failed to confirm it. This leaves another case (which as
we shall see is comprised of two sub-cases) where a statute
contradicting Natural Law has not been abrogated by custom. It
would seem that the judge is not permitted to abrogate written
laws. "In the case of temporal ordinances, although men pass
judgment on them when they are being instituted, a judge may
not pass judgment on them after they are instituted and
confirmed, but only according to them."2 7 A careful read of this
passage leaves open the possibility of abrogating a written
statute after enactment but before confirmation. It states a
judge may not pass judgment on them after they have been
"enacted" and "confirmed."2 °8 This would indicate that a judge
may judge a statute during its period of entry into the legal
system, after enactment and before confirmation. 20 9 This would
be a logical conclusion because one way a statute is confirmed is
by its reception into the customs of the people. One way of
entering the customs of a people would be the customary
enforcement of the statute by courts. Thus, judicial evaluation of
newly enacted statutes that reverse longstanding customs,
subject to the qualifications and limitations on this process
discussed supra, appears to be part of the necessary process of
confirming statutes, failure of which results in their abrogation.
Yet, this leaves a case where a statute has been instituted
and confirmed, including by enforcement of the statute by courts.
In essence, a bad statute has been instituted and confirmed and
enforced for a significant time by courts. A judge realizes that
the statute violates Natural or Divine Law. An example might
be the fugitive slave laws at issue in the infamous Dred Scott
decision. 21° The Fugitive Slave Act was a restatement of the
common practice of forcefully returning slaves to their owners, a
practice dating back to the Fugitive Slave Clause in the
Constitution. 211
Forcibly enforcing slavery of the type in
existence in nineteenth-century America 212 is contrary to the
207

GRATIAN, DECRETUM, supra note 43, at D. 4 C. 3.

208 Id.

211

Id.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 452 (1856).
U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 2, cl. 3.

212

See FERRARA, supra note 165, at 297.
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210
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principle of the "identical liberty of all" contained in Natural
Law.2 13
Assuming the judge cannot avoid concluding the
ordinance has been confirmed by use, what may such a judge do?
This sub-case goes beyond the first in which the statute was not
yet confirmed. The analysis thus far would suggest that he
cannot simply abrogate the Fugitive Slave Act, again assuming
its confirmation by accepted use. Again many authorities assert
that, absent the exceptions discussed supra, the judge must judge
according to the statute.2 1 4 In one provision of Roman law,
magistrates who failed to enforce a law regarding burial of the
dead outside of towns were ordered to pay the same fine as the
offenders for failing to enforce the statute.2 15 Absent the
exceptions discussed in the prior two cases, it would seem the
judge would have no other choice but to enforce the bad law.
Another exception may be available to our troubled judge. A
long tradition dating from St. Augustine holds that "[a] law
which is not just does not seem to me to be a law."216 The
tradition following St. Augustine is important to understand the
extent of the binding obligation of the law generally. For now we
can observe, however, that at least in extreme cases human laws,
of whatever origin, that compel a violation of the revealed Divine
Law are not laws at all and must be refused. 217 This topic is
broader than current purposes, but it is enough to note that the
principle does not mean all unjust laws (those that transgress the
Natural Law) are abrogated. As we have already observed,
human law will never be a perfect participation in Eternal Law,
and some error must be tolerated for the common good. A more
nuanced evaluation is necessary and even some unjust laws
ought to be obeyed for the common good.218 Yet, we can still
conclude that if a judge is confronted by a statute whose
enforcement would compel the judge to transgress the Divine
Law, the judge must refuse the statute as no law at all. 219 Thus,
213

GRATIAN, DECRETUM, supra note 43, at D. 1 C. 7.

214

E.g., id. at D. 1. C. 5, D. 11 C. 4 ("The authority of longstanding custom and

practice is not... of such moment as to prevail over... ordinance.").
215 JustinianDigest, in 10 THE CIVIL LAW bk. 47, tit. 12.3.5 (The Central Trust
Co. 1932).
216 St. Augustine: The Problem of Free Choice, in ANCIENT CHRISTIAN WRITERS
35, 44 (Johannes Quasten & Joseph C. Plumpe eds., 1955).
217 See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-I, Q. 96, art. 4, at 1020.
218 See id.
219 See id.
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a statute could be abrogated by a judge. Outside of this narrow
exception, it would seem that the judge would be required to
enforce the offensive law. Once again the relationship between
practice and statute is complex, without one having complete
precedence over the other. Their respective authority varies
depending upon the context and the conformity, or transgression,
of each to Natural Law.
Having examined the relationship between ordinance and
custom within the general category of human law, we can
conclude this Subsection by turning from resolving conflicts
among sources of law to examining the criteria for the process of
human legislating. We can begin with written ordinances.
Gratian includes a useful summary of the characteristics of wellwritten laws by Isidore:
A[n] ordinance, then, shall be proper, just, possible, in accord
with nature, in accord with the custom of the country, suitable
to the place and time, necessary, useful, clear enough so that it
contain no hidden deception, and not accommodated to some
private individual, but composed for the common utility of the
citizens.2 20
This passage succinctly integrates many of the themes we
have been examining. Human law must be woven out of a
dialectical interaction between Natural Law and the customs of
the community for whom they are made. To the extent they
accord with Natural Law they will be proper and just as suited to
human nature. To the extent they accord with the customs of the
people the laws will be suitable for the time and place in which
they appear. A third element woven through this dialectical
tension between nature and custom is the common good. Laws
must be written so as to address the common good of the
community and not just the individual good of some members.2 2 1
The skill of a lawmaker is to draft clear ordinances that express
general Natural Law principles in a particular manner suited to
the particular instantiation of the common good in an actual
community. Human laws cannot be made in the abstract but
only in the particular context of the customs of a community.2 22

220

GRATIAN, DECRETUM, supra note 43, at D. 4 C. 2.

See McCall, The Architecture of Law, supra note 1, at 93.
See GRATIAN, DECRETUM, supra note 43, at D. 4 C. 2 ("[B]ecause what is
against the custom of the inhabitants is abrogated through their contrary custom.").
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The requirement that good laws are written according to the
customs of a particular community points to another relationship
between written law and custom. Since written law should be
framed in accordance with the customs of the community, those
laws should be interpreted likewise. If one criteria of written law
is that it be suited to a time and place, it should be read and
understood in the same context. Part of the gloss on the phrase
"customs of the country" in this passage from the Decretum says
that "ordinances are interpreted according to custom." 22

St.

Thomas Aquinas likewise lists three legal effects of custom:
"[Clustom has the force of a law, abolishes law, and is the
interpreter of law."224 The dialectical relationship of statute and

custom thus continues, even when custom does not abrogate law,
in that laws should be interpreted in accordance with custom and
not merely according to a presumed original intent of the statute
if that intent is seen as an abstraction devoid of connection to the
customs of the people.
Yet, as we have noted, not all customs are good. Although
morality calls individuals to strive to maintain only good habits,
in reality the habits of individuals at any point in time are
usually comprised of both good and bad ones. Hopefully the
individual is working to nurture the good and extirpate the bad.
Communities are also comprised of a mixture of good and bad
customs. Although bad customs need to be rooted up, the
practical idealism of St. Thomas Aquinas's Aristotelianism
recognizes that the rooting up is an act of prudence that may
take time to achieve. 22 1 "The purpose of human law is to lead
men to virtue, not suddenly, but gradually." 22 6 St. Thomas

Aquinas clearly teaches that the end or goal of human law is
perfect conformity to Natural Law.227 Yet, he recognizes that at
any given moment in time, systems of human laws will fall short
of that goal in different respects.
Human laws need to be made in the context of particular
communities, taking into account the particular state of the
Interpreting Isidore's
virtue of the customs maintained.
223

Id.

224 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-Il, Q. 97, art. 3, at 1024.

Q. 96, art. 2, at 1018.

225

Id. pt. I-II,

226

Id.

227

See id. pt. I-II, Q. 95, art. 2, at 1014 ("Consequently every human law has

just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature.").
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description of well-written law discussed supra, St. Thomas
Aquinas explains that for a law to be proper, it must be
proportional to the nature of the people for whom it is made.2 2
Thus, different rules are framed for adults and children in light
of their differing capacities. 229 Likewise, because "human law is
framed for a number of human beings, the majority of whom are
not perfect in virtue," 23 0 human laws do not, and St. Thomas
Aquinas argues should not, prescribe every virtue or punish
every vice. 23 ' Human law cannot approve of or compel violations
of Natural and Divine law, or otherwise it would be no law at all,
but it may, by certain omissions, necessitated by the state of a
community's customs, neglect to forbid or punish all
infractions.2 32 Doing so does not leave the vice unregulated. As
human law is merely the lowest level in a hierarchy of law, the
action remains subject to Divine and Natural Law.
Returning to the architectural analogy, even if a builder
neglects to paint a wall, that does not mean the wall does not
exist. Likewise, simply because a community's law has not yet
enacted a particular determination of a Natural Law precept
does not mean that precept ceases to stand to rule the choices of
individuals. Even before the first particular traffic rule was
framed, the Natural Law obligated people to drive safely.
St. Thomas Aquinas explains the omissions in human law:
[Hiuman law is given to the people among whom there are
many lacking virtue, and it is not given to the virtuous alone.
Hence human law was unable to forbid all that is contrary to
virtue; and it suffices for it to prohibit whatever is destructive of
human intercourse, while it treats other matters as though they
were lawful, not by approving of them, but by not punishing
them .... On the other hand the Divine
law leaves nothing
233
unpunished that is contrary to virtue.
Human law cannot actually approve of vice; it may merely
omit to punish a particular instance. Since human law has
concurrent jurisdiction with the other forms of law, Man is still
accountable for vice under other law.234 The process of rooting up
228
229
230

231
232
233
234

Id. pt. I-II, Q. 96, art. 2, at 1018.
Id.
Id.
Id. pt. I-II, Q. 96, arts. 2-3, at 1018-19.

Id.
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 77, art. 1, at 1514.
Id. pt. I-I1, Q. 96, art. 2, at 1018.
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bad customs and leading Men to virtue is a slow and gradual
process. Lines must be drawn. Once again, the principle of the
common good is what guides the fixing of the line between
enacting a particular law and abstaining in light of the particular
situation of a community. Those violations of Natural Law which
are "destructive of human intercourse," or destructive of living in
society for the common good, are those which human law must
2 35

root up.

In recognizing this important limitation on human law's
ability to proscribe virtue and prescribe vice, we can again
observe the important tension between universal and particular,
as well as between the desired perfect good and the accepted
practical reality. This dialectical tension is resolved by the
necessity of orienting the law to the common good of a real
community with a particular customary history. Thus, no two
legal systems will be identical, although, to be real legal systems,
they will exhibit a commonality of purpose and orientation.
Likewise, no two houses will be identical in detail but will have
to exhibit a commonality of form to be recognizable as houses.
In summary, the process of human lawmaking is
multidimensional. It is a deductive or inductive process making
use of general principles of natural reason known through
common practices (jus gentium) and particular practices of the
particular community. Law emerges out of tensions among
written ordinance and customary usages. Each cause of law
possesses certain precedence over the other and vice-versa.
Custom can confirm-or refuse to confirm-law, make law,
abrogate law, and interpret it.
Classical Natural Law
jurisprudence conceives of the role of the human legislator, the
lawgiver, in fairly modest terms. Human legislators are a part of
a complex dialectical process, not the Alpha and the Omega of
the legal system. Statutes they promulgate can root up bad
custom and give sanction to good custom. Dante's portrayal of

235

See id. pt. II-Il, Q. 77, art. 1 at 1514; see also id. pt. I-II, Q. 96, art. 2, at 1018

(explaining that human law should prohibit those vices "without the prohibition of
which human society could not be maintained"), pt. I-II, Q. 96, art. 3, at 1019
(explaining that human law only requires virtuous acts "that are ordainable to the
common good-either immediately, as when certain things are done directly for the
common good,-or mediately, as when a lawgiver prescribes certain things
pertaining to good order, whereby the citizens are directed in the upholding of the

common good ofjustice and peace").
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Justinian, "the Empire's greatest law-giver," 236 in his The Divine
Comedy aptly expresses this limited conception of legislators.
Justinian introduces himself and describes his great work of
codifying centuries of Roman law simply by stating: "I was
Caesar and am Justinian, who, by will of the Primal Love which
moves me, removed from the laws what was superfluous and
vain."237 Rather than describing his work as commanding newly
devised precepts, he characterizes it as pruning, removing from
the existing civil laws what had become superfluous or vain.
Dante's Justinian, rather than seeing the lawgiver as supreme
commander of new precepts born of his will, places him within
the midst of an historically developing dialectical process of
refining the decoration of the pre-existing legal framework of the
Natural Law.
II.

APPLICATION TO PARTICULAR ISSUES IN

HUMAN LAWMAKING

Part I elucidated the purpose of human law as a process of
making more explicit and particular the principles of the Natural
Law, as reinforced by Divine Law. Essentially, making human
law involves selecting appropriate means to a predetermined
end. From ancient times, this process has been seen as a long
and gradual process of discovering with more precision the
principles of Natural Law and developing expressions of those
2 38
principles within a people's particular customary tradition.
The history of Roman jurisprudence exemplifies this
understanding of human law in many respects. Cicero explained
the development of law as an evolution of customs from Natural
Law over time. Roman law developed through case law decisions
of the Praetors applying either thejus civile to Roman citizens or
the jus gentium to aliens. Yet, Roman law was more than pure
casuistry.
Throughout its development, legislation would
interact with developing jurisprudence. Finally, various jurists
would survey the legal history and attempt to elucidate the

236 DANTE, THE DMNE COMEDY 3: PARADISO 96 (John D. Sinclair trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 1939). I am grateful to my colleague Jason Houston, whose on-campus
lecture on Canto VI of the Paradiso, "Reading the Signs of History in Dante's
Paradiso," September 10, 2014, directed my attention to this passage.
237 Id. at 87.
238See, e.g., SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-II, Qs. 95-97, at 1013-25.
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principles underlying the particular decisions. 2 9 The Corpus
Juris Civilis of Justinian represents the final product of the
Roman system. It contains a compilation of specific legislative
determinations,2 4 ° summaries of specific resolutions of various
particular cases,241 and a systematic summary of the principles
underlying these particular laws. 242 Gratian, writing at the time
of the great revival of Roman law, applied this approach to the
organization of the law of the Church. His Decretum contains an
introductory summary of the principles of law243 followed by a
collection of case law decisions and legislative enactments drawn
from the past 1,000-year history of the Church organized by
subject matter. Structurally, the work presents cases, or causae,
which are resolved by comparison with the collection of prior
decisions and enactments. Both the Corpus Juris Civilis and the
Decretum are a compilation of temporal and ecclesiastical law
drawn from the varied customary and statutory sources that
developed over time.
This Part turns from this theoretical and historical overview
of human lawmaking from a Natural Law perspective to consider
several contemporary issues facing jurisprudence.
A.

Common Versus Civil Law

Modern law rooted in the history of the Western legal
tradition 2" can be divided into two main types or systems,
generally referred to as Common Law and Civil Law. 245 Although
most legal systems are not pure examples, and in fact contain
elements of both types,24 6 individual systems tend to be
239 See, e.g., Gaius, Institutes, in 1 THE CIVIL LAw 81, 81-83, 196 (The Central

Trust Co. 1932) (author's translation).
240

See generally JustinianCodex and Novelles, in THE CIVIL LAW vols. XII-XVII

(The Central Trust Co. 1932).
241 See generally JustinianDigest, supra note 215, at vols. III-XI.
242 See JustinianInstitutes, supra note 142, at vol. II.
24 See GRATIAN, DECRETUM, supra note 43, at D. 1-D. 20.
244

By which I mean Western Europe, America, and former colonies of these

nations whose legal systems have been adapted from prior colonial rulers and thus

exclude from the discussion two other categories of legal systems-Socialist law and
Islamic law. See JAMES S.E. OPOLOT, WORLD LEGAL TRADITIONS AND INSTITUTIONS

9 (rev. ed. 1981).
245 Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 285, 288 (2008).
246 See Opolot, supra note 244. The United States, for example, possesses a legal

system built upon the Common Law model, yet many areas of the law have been
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dominated by more of the characteristics typically referred to by
the general categories of Common Law or Civil Law. In recent
decades debate has ensued over the superiority of one approach
over the other.247
This Subsection will examine what
contribution the foregoing Natural Law analysis of human
lawmaking brings to this debate between the two types of legal
systems.
Although simple definitions are under-inclusive, we must
begin at some point. The differences between legal systems
characterized as Common Law and Civil Law touch many areas,
such as court procedure and criminal presumption. 2 '
The
particular aspect we shall examine in relation to each system is
the method for making and developing law exemplified by each.
In light of this specific purpose the following definitions can serve
to present the contrast between the two systems. A Common
Law system is characterized by appellate judge-made law
formulated in response to specific controversies. 2 9 Legal rules
emerge as particular responses to resolving individual disputes.
As new disputes arise, prior rules are refined and developed in
light of previously formulated rules and the new factual
scenarios. The term "case law" can function as a synonym for our
intended definition of Common Law. Common Law identifies a
legal system in which: (1) a significant portion of laws; (2) are
formulated over periods of time; (3) in response to specific
disputes; (4) by judges who see themselves as refining or further
specifying an ordered system of law not of their own creation and
which pre-exists their tenure; (5) periodically refined and even
overturned either by legislative enactments or in grave cases
judicial reversals of prior decisions.
Civil Law systems are dominated not by judge-made law, but
rather by comprehensive codes, that can be defined as "a statute
which covers the whole law, or the whole of some branch or

superseded by comprehensive codes, such as the Uniform Commercial Code and the
Model Penal Code. See id.
247 See, e.g., Richard B. Cappalli, At the Point of Decision: The Common Law's
Advantage over the Civil Law, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 87, 87 (1998); La Porta et
al., supra note 245, at 286; Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic
Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 519 (2001).
248 See OPOLOT, supra note 244, at 13-98.
249 La Porta et al., supra note 245.
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province of the law."250 The term code is an ambiguous word,
referring to two very different objects. The Code of Justinian and
the United States Code represent one type, which, for the
purpose of distinction, we can call a code of compilation. The
Code Napoleon or the Uniform Commercial Code comprise
another type of code, which we can refer to as a comprehensive
code. A code of compilation merely collects and organizes by
subject matter prior laws enacted over the course of time. 251 A
comprehensive code is a newly written law which is enacted to
supersede all prior legislation covering the field of law of the
code.252 A code of compilation enacts no new law but merely
brings a systematized order to legislation adopted over the course
of time. As new statutes are enacted, they are integrated or
appended to the code. 2 3 Although produced after a study of prior
legislation, comprehensive codes go beyond merely organizing
existing law. They rewrite and supersede all prior law. The
Code Napoleon adopted points of law that were completely new
and in some cases reversed prior law. The concept of legality
that emerged from the French Revolution and was spread
throughout Continental Europe by Napoleon rejects the
"lawmaking role of the courts" and "resulted in the articulation of
the primacy of the legislature."254 Therefore, for purposes of this
Part, Civil Law jurisdiction refers to a collection of the following
characteristics: (1) a comprehensive code or codes, (2) which is or
are intended to be complete and final in the applicable area,
(3) enacted on the premise that statutes are preeminent over
customs and history, (4) by a legislator who is the actual
normative source of law and not just the determiner of law
within a positive legal system.

250

R. FLOYD CLARKE,

THE

SCIENCE OF LAW AND LAWMAKING:

BEING AN

INTRODUCTION TO LAW, A GENERAL VIEW OF ITS FORMS AND SUBSTANCE, AND A

DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION OF CODIFICATION 10 (The Macmillan Co. 1898).
251 1 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2012).
252

U.C.C. § 1-103(a).

In the case of Justinian's Code, this was done through appending the Novels
to the Code. The United States Code is updated periodically to remove repealed
legislation and insert adopted legislation.
254 Leonard Besselink et al., Introduction: Legality in Multiple Legal Orders, in
2-3

THE ECLIPSE OF THE LEGALITY PRINCIPLE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 6 (Leonard

Besselink et al. eds., 2011).
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The process of making law in Common Law systems is
embedded in the facts, and in the analogizing and distinguishing
of new scenarios.2 55 Even when reading a new statute, Common
Law courts employ analogical reasoning and appeal to
precedent.25 6 This characterization makes Common Law sound
purely inductive. "[T]he common law exalts the particulars,
which, as the court encodes them in its narrative, become a set of
givens, enabling the formation of the legal standard or
proposition for which the pending case will stand in the future,
for others to claim as legal precedent."25 7
Yet the process is also permeated with deductive reasoning
in addition to the inductive formulation of rules from casespecific facts. Once legal rules have been formulated out of
particular disputes, those rules become general principles from
which new rules and applications can be deduced.
Within the common-law legal system, for example, by virtue of
the courts' crafting of legal principles, each precedent stands for
a legal norm from which applications to future pending cases
can be deduced. Common-law reasoning thus clearly contains a
deductive component that is as intrinsic to its nature as the
analogical reasoning by similarity and dissimilarity which
dominates the comparative process of evaluating the legal
significance of a pending case by weighing it against prior case
law. 258
Harold Berman describes this type of legal method as having
been developed by the Medieval jurists working with the texts of
Roman law.
The jurists thus gave the West its characteristic methods of
analysis and synthesis of texts. They taught the West to
synthesize cases into rules, rules into principles, principles into
a system. Their method, which is still that of legal science in
the United States today, was to determine what various
particulars have in common, to see the whole as the interaction

255 Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law:
Legal Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR.

L. 63, 76-77 (2001).
256 Id. at 93.
257
218

Id.
Id. at 105.
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of the parts ....[Ilt took the customs and rules as data and
adduced from the data the regularities-the "laws"-that
259
explained them.
This description highlights the connection between inductive
reasoning from particular cases and deductive creation of a
system of principles which characterizes the Common Law
system. This dialectical process of making law by judicial case
decision resembles the description of the role of custom contained
in Part 1.26 Human law contained in case decisions is developed
over time in response to the particular developing practices of a
legal community. Justice Cardozo similarly connected the case
law method to customs when he said, "[T]he judge in shaping the
rules of law must heed the mores of his day."2 61 Professor James
Whitman likewise connects the development of the historicism of
English Common Law to its deep respect for custom. 2 62 Case law,
like general customs, develops gradually and in light of an
adherence to precedent.
Its default starting point is the
transmission of existing practices. The late nineteenth-century
defender of the Common Law, Joel Prentiss Bishop, described the
Common Law in language reminiscent of Cicero and the Natural
Law tradition described in Part I:
They [laws] are the visible product of invisible laws,-imperfect
and incomplete in their first formations, because man is
imperfect, but capable of being gradually improved and
perfected by reason.
Following instinct, or conscience, or whatever else we call it,-in
other words, moved by impulses from the nature given by God
to man,-he, while living as all must in society, establishes
various customs and usages. After they become universal the
court takes judicial cognizance of them as law. When statutes
2 63
are enacted it takes the like cognizance of them also."

BERMAN, supra note 205, at 529.
Jean Porter has drawn the same conclusion. See PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE
LAW, supra note 9, at 256 ('The common law tradition informing the legal systems of
England and its former colonies is itself a kind of customary law, extending well
259
260

beyond those areas of law explicitly identified as falling within its scope.").
261 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 104 (Yale

Univ. Press 2007).

262 JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE LEGACY OF ROMAN LAw IN THE
ERA: HISTORICAL VISION AND LEGAL CHANGE 71-72 (1990).

GERMAN ROMANTIC

263 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMON LAw AND CODIFICATION, 3, 9-10 (1888).
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This Common Law attachment to precedent as custom
resembles the attitude towards custom described in Part I. The
developing case law contains the usages and customs of the legal
community.
Although custom is to be a general guide for human law, bad
customs need to be rooted out. Likewise, the Common Law limits
the adherence to custom.
The principle of stare decisisparticularly as applied
by
the
American
judiciary-is a principle
subject to exception. 264 Whereas some jurists have struggled to
articulate a consistent standard for when stare decisis is to be
followed 265 and when it is to be overruled, the analysis in Part I
provides an answer. When a precedent represents a bad custom
it should be rooted up.2 66 Bad precedents can and should be
overturned when they are contrary to reason, or Natural Law
principles.2 6 7 Joel Prentiss Bishop described the relationship
between Natural Law principles and changes in law:
Now, for a court to decide a question differing from what has
gone before, it must take cognizance of the law engraved, not by
man, but by God, on the nature of man. In other words, it must
take cognizance of what our predecessors have named the
unwritten law, or common law. This law has already been

264 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28 (1991) ("[W]hen governing
decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, this Court has never felt
constrained to follow precedent. Stare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather,
it is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest
decision." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
26 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992);
Robert Barnhart, Note, PrincipledPragmaticStare Decisis in Constitutional Cases,
80 NOTRE DAME. L. REV. 1911, 1911 (2005); Daniel M. O'Keefe, Stare Decisis: What
Should the Supreme Court Do When Old Laws Are Not Necessarily Good Laws? A
Comment on Justice Thomas' Call for Reassessment in the Supreme Court's Voting

Rights Jurisprudence,40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 261, 261-262 (1996).
266 GRATIAN, DECRETUM, supra note 43, at D. 8 C. 7 (describing truth's

supremacy over custom and custom's strength when it is supported by truth).
267 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1967) (overturning Pace v.
Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1883), which held that states could prohibit interracial
marriages because of potential harm to white marriages); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (overturning Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 547-48
(1896), which held that separate facilities for blacks and whites were constitutional
so long as they were equal); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391-92
(1937) (overturning Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 60 (1905), which held that
the Constitution included a freedom to contract with which government could not
interfere).
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discovered by judicial wisdom to consist of a beautiful and
harmonious something not palpable to the visible sight, yet to
the understanding obvious and plain, called principles.268
As Bishop explains, the deductive or inductive nature of the
Common Law process allows for the discovery of general
principles of reason, or the Natural Law, which then can be used
to correct prior mistakes by overruling bad precedents. He
argues, "[W]hat is termed the law's progress or growth consists,
more than in anything else, in discoveries of its just and true
reasons, and in correcting old mistakes as to them."2 69
Still, courts are not the entire legal system even in Common
Law countries; statutes also have a role in traditional Common
Law systems, particularly in correcting such old mistakes.2 7 ° Yet
their function is often understood as more akin to the role of
enactment described in Part I, a tailored pruning of the gradually
developing case law as opposed to a way to supplant it.
Legislation is episodic and often focused on reversing a particular
line of case law considered unsatisfactory.2 7 ' This narrower role
of legislation is reinforced by the principle of construing
derogations of existing Common Law strictly.2 72 This principle
reinforces the idea that law develops gradually through
decisions, with legislation weaving in and out of the process to
guide its development.
Roscoe Pound observed that
notwithstanding claims of legislative supremacy, the interpretive
power of courts means that judges possess a de facto supremacy
in their ability to narrowly interpret and apply statutes.2 7 3
The proposition that statutes in derogation of the common law
are to be construed strictly... assumes that legislation is
something to be deprecated. As no statute of any consequence
dealing with any relation of private law can be anything but in
derogation of the common law,... [one] must always face the

BisHop, supranote 263, at 11.
Id. at 12.
270 See Curran, supra note 255, at 83.
268

269

272

See id. at 75.
Id. at 84-85.

271

See Curran, supra note 255, at 83; Roscoe Pound, Common Law and

271

Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 386 (1908).
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situation that the legislative act ... will find no sympathy in
those who apply it, will be construed strictly, and will be made
to interfere with the status quo as little as possible.2 74
The approach described by Pound resembles the dialectical
interaction between ordinance and custom, especially the role of
confirmation of statutes, discussed in Part I. The final part of
the legislative process involves confirmation by the community,
which in Common Law countries occurs through the acceptance
and application of the statute by courts. To the extent that it is
narrowly interpreted and applied, it is confirmed.7
The philosophical vision of human lawmaking described in
Part I appears to justify a Common Law tradition allowing for a
dialectical development of law over time. As Jeremiah Newman
explains, for the Natural Law tradition, the primary image of a
political ruler is the judge who declares and enforces the law
rather than a legislator. 6 For Aristotle, a ruler discovers and
declares law rather than enacts it, 2 77 since in his vision, law "is
no code: it is the custom, written and unwritten, which has
developed with the development of a state."278 Law is made
through courts and legislatures transmitting and pruning
custom. A qualified respect for custom is shown in the process
through a doctrine of stare decisis, which still permits either
legislatures or courts to overrule laws made in opposition to
reason.
The Civil Law system, by contrast, places the emphasis on
comprehensive legal codes. A comprehensive code is written on a
clean slate and is meant to supersede all prior law as a final and
comprehensive statement of the whole law or of the law of a
particular subtopic. As Professor Curran explains:
By contrast, the civil law focuses on codes, written texts
designed to govern throughout time, designed to embody the
immutably true, to embody principles so reliable that they
supersede and can withstand the vicissitudes of the particular,

274
275

Pound, supranote 273, at 387.
Id. at 396.

276 See JEREMIAH NEWMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF JUSTICE: A HISTORICO-CRITICAL

STUDY IN THOMISM 40 (1954).
277 THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 367 (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1946).
278

Id. at lv.
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of the temporal, of the myriad contextual elements that connect
human beings
to the legal issues they ask courts to
279
adjudicate.
Civil Law codes use legislation to formulate axiomatic
principles of Kantian reasoning and are held out to be "a
coherent and complete representation of law, all of its parts
mutually reconcilable." 280 Although prior laws may be studied in
preparing the code, the project aims at a complete articulation of
law, or a part of law, at a particular moment in history.
Professor Tunc likewise summarizes the philosophy of the prototype of modern Civil Law codes, which is the French Napoleonic
Code:
Portalis' excellent Discours prdliminaire, which so admirably
explains the thought of the drafters of the Code civil, suggests
that the French concept of the law rests on three fundamental
principles: A code ought to be complete in its field; it ought to
be drafted in relatively general principles rather than in
detailed rules; and it ought at the same time to fit them
as a coherent whole and to be based on
together logically
281
experience.
Codes aspire to be complete, axiomatic, and logically
comprehensive as a whole. 282 They are written rather than
developed over time. By its abstract axioms, the code remains
detached from particulars or the contingent matter of life. The
English utilitarian, Jeremy Bentham,8 3 was a great admirer and
advocate of modern codes. He also believed that codes could be
formulated so completely as to answer all legal questions once
and for all, in a sense outside of history. He boasted:

279

Curran, supra note 255, at 100-01.

280

Id. at 95.

281 Andr6 Tunc, Methodology of the Civil Law in France, 50 TUL. L. REV. 459,

459-60 (1976) (footnote omitted).
282 Id. at 469.
283 Bentham attempted to get himself hired to replicate Napoleon's process in
any jurisdiction willing to pay. See Philip Schofield & Jonathan Harris, Editorial
Introduction to JEREMY BENTHAM, 'LEGISLATOR OF THE WORLD': WRITINGS ON
CODIFICATION, LAW, AND EDUCATION,

at xi, xi (Philip Schofield & Jonathan Harris

eds., Clarendon Press 2009) ("Bentham offered to draw up such a code, but only if he
were formally requested to do so. He was not prepared to embark on the arduous
task of codifying unless he were given sufficient encouragement. He therefore
wished to receive an invitation from a 'constituted authority' asking him to draw up
a code of law.. ").
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Were any such all-comprehensive Code in existence, and
executed as it ought to be and might be, seldom would there be
any such question as a question of law: never any other
question of law than a question concerning the import of28this
or
4
that portion of the existing text of the really existing law.
One might conclude that this process seems commensurate
with Natural Law legal jurisprudence, which argues that the
Natural Law contains comprehensive general principles of action
derived from a unified systemic whole, the Eternal Law. Yet,
despite the similarities, the Civil Law process errs by conflating
the two levels of law. These characteristics-general axioms,
completeness, wholeness, a transcendence of particular times
and places-characterize the Natural Law. Human law, as
described in Part I, is more detailed, particular, and incomplete.
The very claim of the code to be complete, to make law for all
cases, directly contradicts St. Thomas Aquinas's conclusion
described in Part I that human law not only cannot, but should
not, address all vices. In an attempt to be complete, the code
fails to take account of the particular situation of the people for
whom it is made.
Human law should involve particular
determinations of the general principles in relevant evolving
historical contexts. Due to weaknesses in the reasoning process,
lawmakers are prone to err in the elucidation and refinement of
Natural Law principles. 28 5 A Common Law system of historical
development limited to particular cases contains the effect of any
one person's mistakes.
Chancellor Kent in his famous
commentary on American law quotes Sir Matthew Hale: "[T]he
common law of England is, 'not the product of the wisdom of
some one man, or society of men, in any one age; but of the
wisdom, counsel, experience, and observation of many ages of

wise and observing men.'

"286

Another nineteenth-century advocate of retaining the
Common Law in America, J. Bleecker Miller, looked to the
Roman law as a historical example of a legal system developed
not by one Man but across generations. For Miller, Roman law
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Clarendon Press 2009).
28. See McCall, The Divine Law, supra note 7, at 108.
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1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 536 (0. W. Holmes, Jr.
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was not the prototype of Civil Law codes but rather an example
of a historically rooted Common Law tradition.287 He explained,
"[Tihe great merit of the Roman Law being, that it is a natural
product of one people, with which no legislator interfered before
its perfection." 288

Once it reached a maturity of historical

development, its components-case decisions, ordinances, and
general principles-could then be gathered into the systemic
whole by Justinian.
Civil Law codes, contrary to Miller's understanding of the
evolution of Roman law, attempt to usurp the place of Natural
Law as well as the customary evolution of its determination. The
legislator is charged with the task of composing the general
axioms which Natural Law considers merely as given. 289 The

axioms serve as means for reaching particular determinations
through the guidance of evolving customs. By contrast, the
premise of the Civil Code is that the legislator posits the axioms,
which places them at the wrong level of the legal edifice.
According to the Civil Law system, legislation deals in
absolutes,29 ° whereas for Natural Law jurisprudence, human
legislation deals in contingent matters-choices which could be
decided in more than one way. 291 The levels of absolute truth are
the Eternal, Natural, and Divine Law; human law is contingent
and contextualized. This difference between the Common Law
and Civil Law understanding of the contingent nature of human
law is epitomized by the terminology used to refer to court action.
Common Law courts tend to refer to their products as opinions
whereas the Civil Law system typically refers to decisions:
"ddcision"in French and "Entscheidung"in German.292

" In contrast to the view that continental European legal systems form one
group based on Roman law and Anglo-American another based on a rejection of
Roman law, Harold Berman has argued that all Western legal systems including
continental European and Anglo-American ones share "common historical roots." See
BERMAN, supra note 205, at 539.
288

J. BLEECKER MILLER, DESTRUCTION OF OUR NATURAL LAW BY CODIFICATION

7 (1882).

Curran, supra note 255, at 95.
Id. at 93.
291 See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-I, Q. 91, art. 4, at 998, pt. I-I,
Q. 96, art. 1, at 1018.
292 Curran, supra note 255, at 92.
289
290
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Within the Civil Law system the legislator is supreme.29 3
Hobbes expressed this supremacy by holding the following three
principles, among five others, to be fundamental to the legal
order: "[f]irst, that the sovereign is the sole legislator; second,
that the sovereign is effectively immune to civil laws, since they
may change those laws at will; and third, that any norms or
conventions only become law because the sovereign indicates a
tolerance for them by his inaction."2 94
Rather than making particular periodic determinations
bounded by general principles of Natural Law, the Hobbsian
sovereign enacts the whole law in the code. The code may be
changed at will by the Sovereign, and changes are limited by
neither principles of Natural Law nor custom.2 95 Custom is only
law to the extent the legislative Sovereign permits it to continue.
The general principles of the code are stated in the abstract and
derive from the enactment of the Code, not from the evolution of
customary practices. This exaltation of the legislator, the author
of the Code, has consequences for the Civil Law's understanding
of the judiciary. French opinions, taken to exemplify the Civil
Law approach, tend to be short, anonymous, and abstract, and
lack reasoning dissent or concurrence.29 6 Additionally, Civil Law
court opinions tend to avoid detailed recitation or analysis of the
particular facts of the case decided.2 97 This tendency is a
consequence of understanding the code as containing all the law
through unfailing abstract principles. As a result, the judge is
viewed as merely logically applying the absolute abstract
principle.
Common Law opinions by contrast typically contain lengthy
discussions of the particular facts of the case.298 As a result,
Common Law reasoning arrives at general principles, not
through legislative flat, but through the inductive process of case
resolution. Such a process keeps ever present the reminder that
general principles are capable of exceptions. As St. Thomas
Aquinas explained, because Natural Law precepts are applied to
293 See Besselink et al., supra note 254.
294 Benjamin Lee Samuel Nelson, Unwritten Law: Three Selections from the
History of Political Philosophy 3 (May 19, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract=2062924 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2062924).
295 Id.

29 Tunc, supra note 281, at 466-67.
297 Curran, supra note 255, at 87-88.
298

Id. at 87.
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contingent human actions, "although there is necessity in the
general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the
more frequently we encounter defects."2 99 By defect, he does not
mean that the principle is defective, but rather its application in
the particular facts would fail "because the greater the number of
conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the
principle may fail." °0 St. Thomas Aquinas gives the example of
the principle of the Natural Law that if one accepts possession of
goods for safekeeping, he should return them.3 01 Yet, in some
cases this principle fails, as when for example the one to whom
they will be returned is planning to use them to fight one's
country. 0 2 The Common Law's determination of law's general
principles based on application to discrete facts, and the process
of distinguishing precedents on the facts, reminds the judge of
this tendency of principles to fail to apply in some contingent
cases.03
Oliver Wendell Holmes contrasted the abstract logical
formalism of Civil Law courts to the more fluid experiential
Common Law process: "The life of the law has not been logic: it
has been experience. '"204 By which, he does not mean that the
Common Law is illogical, but rather, it is a logic worked out
through experience rather than axiom. Common Law judges
discover the logic by applying principles over time and thereby
Civil Law achieves a logical code by
gaining experience.3°
having a legislature impose the logical whole upon the law
independent of the particular facts of a case.3 06 By contrast, the
Common Law assumes the logical whole exists in the law, and
judges are merely attempting to knit together and shine a light
upon the various intersecting threads in the tapestry that preSUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-II, Q. 94, art. 4, at 1011.
300Id.
301 Id.
302 Id. pt. I-II, Q. 94, art. 4, at 1011, pt. I-II, Q. 96, art. 6, at 1021 (discussing
299

exceptions to a general rule about keeping the gates of the city closed), pt. II-II, Q.
62, art. 5, at 1458-59 (regarding exceptions to the rule that restitution of goods to

their owner must be made but a sword should not be restored to a madman).
"0'Curran, supra note 255, at 92 (arguing that the assembly of particular
examples "no matter how numerous they may be, is vulnerable to defeat by
counterexample").
304OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (The Lawbook Exchange,
Ltd. 2005) (1881).
305 Id.
306 Curran, supra note 255, at 93.
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exists.
The Civil Law system thus appears to lack the
appropriate dialectical tension between legislature and judiciary
that was part of the development of law rooted in custom
described in Part I.
The philosophy of Common Law jurisprudence thus appears
more commensurate with the understanding of the relationship
of human law to Natural Law described in Part I. Legislation is
understood as a more limited and constrained process, which
interacts dialectically with evolving customs to prune and guide
the development of a community's particular determinations.A0
Judicial conflicts are resolved through a deductive or inductive
process of inducting general principles from particular facts as
well as deductively developing those principles.
The entire
process is factually and historically rooted in particular
contingent details, the matter of human lawmaking. By contrast,
the Civil Law approach usurps the level of Natural Law by
transforming human law into a legislature of general abstract
principles, which are seen to be the entire law mechanically
applied by courts."' The law is disconnected both from preexisting Natural Law norms and evolving customs. The result is
the supremacy of the legislature in Civil Law jurisprudence, in
contrast to a more fluid relationship in Common Law
jurisprudence. J.N. Figgis extolled the Common Law tradition
for this very reason. It trusts no single legislator to know and
articulate all principles of natural reason perfectly, but rather
allows their discovery across time. As he explains: "Common
Law is the perfect ideal of law; for it is natural reason developed
and expounded by the collective wisdom of many generations."3 9
St. Thomas Aquinas would agree: "No man is so wise as to be
able to take account of every single case; wherefore he is not able
sufficiently to express in words all those things that are suitable
for the end he has in view." 1 0
Ironically, one of the drafters of Napoleon's Civil Code,
Portalis, expressed an understanding of the limitations and
necessary historical contextualization of law that stands in sharp

307 Id. at 92.

"I Id. at 93.
309 JOHN NEVILLE FIGGIS, THE DIVINE RIGHT OF KINGS 229 (Cambridge Univ.

Press 2d ed. 1934) (1896).
310 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt.

I, Q. 96, art. 6, at 1022.
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contrast to the way his Code has come to be seen in Civil Law
jurisdictions.
Laws are not pure acts of will; they are acts of wisdom, of
justice, and of reason. The legislator does not so much exercise
a power as he fulfills a sacred trust. One ought never to forget
that laws are made for men, not men for laws; that they must
be adapted to the character, to the habits, to the situation of the
people for whom they are drafted; that one ought to be wary of
innovations in matters of legislation .... 311

A Common Law system which fosters dialectical interaction
among existing precedent, Natural Law principles, case decisions
and targeted legislation seems to fulfill Portalis's criteria more
than his abstract, trans-historical code.
B.

The Problem of Legislation

As noted in the previous Subsection, both Common Law and
Civil Law systems rely to varying degrees on legislation. This
Subsection will argue that legislation, both in Civil Law
jurisdictions with their comprehensive codes and in Common
Law jurisdictions that have yielded much of the field of law to
statutes, "is a problem in law."312
One problem of modern legislation is its volume. As Patrick
Brennan has remarked: "The statutory codes swell, the case
reporters go into new series, and the Government Printing Office
can barely keep up with our zeal to regulate from soup to
intrauterine devices
....
We are awash in the badges and
313
incidents of law."
As a result, we are "[s]urrounded ... by law on all sides."31 4

The United States Code comprises approximately 235 volumes. 15
The typical state code of laws comprises anywhere from twenty to

311 Translated in Tunc, supra note 281, at 468 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
312

JOSEPH VINING, FROM NEWTON'S SLEEP 155 (1995).

Brennan, Persons, Participating,and "HigherLaw", supra note 11, at 476.
Patrick McKinley Brennan, Are Legislation and Rules a Problem in Law?
Thoughts on the Work of Joseph Vining, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1191, 1191 (2010)
[hereinafter Brennan, Legislationand Rules].
315 See
United States Code Service, LEXISNEXIS, http://www.lexisnexis.com/
store/catalog/booktemplate/productdetail.jsp?pageName=relatedProducts&skuId=S
KU7560&catld=121&prodId=7560# (last visited Feb. 13, 2015) (listing the number
of volumes comprising the United States Code).
313

314
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hundreds of volumes. 16 In the 111th Congress alone, the federal
government passed over 300 new laws including the 906-page
Affordable Care Act.317 Not only are we surrounded by laws, but
the laws we are surrounded by are of greater length than the
Bible, which took thousands of years to complete. Grant Gilmore
once quipped that after the 1930s, our government engaged in an
"orgy of statute making."318 As observed in the prior Subsection
of this Part, although founded as a Common Law jurisdiction,
America no longer represents a pure form of this system.
Although never conquered by the Code Napoleon, America has
allowed her law to be conquered over the course of the twentiethcentury by a creeping, or more accurately, a flooding, invasion of
legislation. 3 9 This Subsection will first consider the causes of
this massive expansion of legislation and then outline some of
the deleterious effects of it.
The primary reason for the expansion of legislation is a
belief, fostered by supporters of codes, now permeating even
Common Law jurisdictions,3 20 that legislation can be complete.
One attribute of modern codification is the claim that the new
legislation includes all law, or all law with respect to a particular
subject area. Notwithstanding this claim to completeness, the
enactment by Napoleon of the Code did not bring an end to law
making. In the twentieth-century changes in daily life led many
to call for wholesale change of the Code and a new type of statute

311 See,
e.g.,
Deering's California Codes Annotated, LEXIsNEXIS,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/store/catalogfbooktemplate/productdetai.jsp?pageName=r
elatedProducts&skuId=SKU7329&catld=360&prodId=7329 (last visited Feb. 13,
2014) (listing the number of volumes comprising California's code as 219); Michie's
West Virginia Code Annotated, LEXISNEXIS, http://www.lexisnexis.com/store/catalog
booktemplate/productdetail.jsp?pageName=relatedProducts&skuId=SKU6989&catI
d=409&prodId=6989 (last visited June 1, 2014) (listing the number of volumes
comprising the code of West Virginia as twenty-nine).
317 Susan Davis, This Congress Could Be Least Productive Since 1947, USA
TODAY (Aug. 15, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/
2012-08-14/unproductive-congress-not-passing-bills/57060096/1.
318

GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977).

Id.
320 This Subsection is premised upon the claim that, although still classed as a
Common Law jurisdiction, the United States has allowed entire sections of the law
to become dominated by legislation and codes. From the various codes of types of law
to the omnibus statutes covering major sections of American life, entire areas of the
law are dominated by codes or omnibus statutes, such as The Securities Act of 1933,
the Dodd-Frank Act, and the Affordable Care Act.
319
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emerged, detailed and regulatory minute rules. 21 France has
seen the growth of executive decrees making detailed rules to
enforce the allegedly complete Code.2 2 Further, in many areas
French courts have developed new areas of law such as unjust
enrichment and products liability. 23 John Henry Merryman has
argued that Napoleon's attempt to draft and promulgate a code
that was complete, coherent, and clear failed quickly, and then
sardonically has added that France forgot to communicate this
failure to the countries that adopted the code system, so the other
countries clung tenaciously to belief in this theory and restricted
judicial scope to develop the law.32 4
Why has the goal of completeness inevitably failed? St.
Thomas Aquinas rendered the answer centuries ago. Law by
definition includes rules. 25 Yet, rules can be understood in two
very different senses, one detailed and precise, specifically
addressing all variables, and the other more general and less
complete in its formulation. 26 Patrick Brennan, in commenting
on the work of Joseph Vining, uses the rules of a game to
exemplify the first class.3 27 Rules in games produce binary
results. In "Monopoly," when one rolls doubles three times, one
must go directly to jail without passing Go.325 Yet, in life and
hence in law, rules are part of a "methodical process that is not
itself governed by any 'rule' (or standard) of law that we have
made."329 Put another way, life is more complicated than a game,
which by definition is played in an artificially simplified
universe, no matter how complicated the particular game may
be.

322

Tunc, supra note 281, at 461.
Id. at 462.

323

Id. at 465-66.

324
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TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND

LATIN AMERICA 144-45 (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW]; John
Henry Merryman, The FrenchDeviation, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 109, 112, 116 (1996).
325 See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-II, Q. 90, art. 1, at 993 ("Law is
a rule and measure of acts. .. ").

See Brennan, Legislation and Rules, supra note 314, at 1202.
Id. at 1203 (commenting on Joseph Vining, The Resilience of Law, in LAW
AND DEMOCRACY IN THE EMPIRE OF FORCE 151, 155-56 (H. Jefferson Powell &
James Boyd White eds., 2009)).
328 Hasbro, Monopoly, http://www.hasbro.com/commonrinstruct/00009.pdf
(last
visited Feb. 13, 2015).
329 Brennan, Legislation and Rules, supra note 314, at 1203 (commenting on
326
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Vining, supra note 327).
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Life, and hence law, is radically more contingent than a
game. As we observed in Part I, law is applied to contingent
matters,33 which vary greatly across time and space. Legislation
can attempt to address such multiplicity of contingent matters in
two ways. First, it can merely contain a rule written as a general
standard of conduct written at a level of generality (a "Standards
Rule").3 31 Alternatively, law can attempt to write a series of
rules, each meant to address a different particular contingent
matter to which the law might need to be applied (a "Game
Rule") .32
To explain, we can adapt an example used by Patrick
Brennan333 of two forms of a statute meant to cover the same
conduct. Example 1 (a Game Rule): "'[lilt shall be a crime to cry
"fire" in a crowded theatre.' ,334 Example 2 (a Standards Rule):
"'[Ilt shall be a crime to cry "fire" in a crowded theatre if all
things considered this was a dangerous thing to do.' ,,3"The
Game Rule is clear and precise, yet incomplete. It does not, on
its face, prohibit shouting earthquake in a crowded stadium. The
Standards Rule is very general and does not specifically address
many situations.
All things considered, what constitutes
"dangerous"? If one makes law from a premise that the only law
that legitimately exists is the complete statutory law made by a
legislator to the exclusion of: (1) the Natural Law; (2) custom;
and (3) law made by the judiciary as it tries cases, one would find
the Game Rule woefully under-inclusive. The only solution is to
write more Game Rules that address other possible scenariosother shouts and other locations-until all possible contingent
matters have been covered. Yet, unlike a board game with a
limited number of spaces on which to land, life is not as finite in
its possibilities. The result is that one would continue writing
more and more Game Rules addressing every conceivable
scenario and then, after completing this task, someone will shout
something not yet conceived in a new location, and the legislator
must go back to expand the legislation to add one more Game
Rule to cover the new space added to the "game board." The
31oSee supra text accompanying note 79.
331 See Brennan, Legislation and Rules, supra note
332

333
334
335
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Id.
Id.

Id.
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result is an endless cycle of amending and expanding the written
law to cover every possible scenario. This has been the pattern
and problem of American legislation involved in the orgy
described by Grant Gilmore. Since America never adopted a code
with more abstract standard rules, her legal system has tended
to adopt Game Rules. Yet, as legislation comes to be seen as allinclusive, the failure of the Game Rules and proliferation of their
number follows.
If the Game Rule in such a system leads to a legislative orgy,
then what of the Standards Rule typically found in a code
system? It would appear to be the only alternative to an everexpanding set of rules trying to overturn the last unjust result,
when the Game Rule failed to cover a new scenario. In fact, the
Standards Rule has been the form of many Civil Law codes,
which, as discussed previously, contain abstract general
Yet, once the Standards Rule is selected, it
standards. 36
eventually becomes necessary to further determine the meaning
of the standard in varying contingent circumstances. New law is
made every time judgment is given that determines the specific
meaning of the standard in the particular facts. Yet, the court in
a code system is, at least in theory, handicapped in this role by
three limitations. First, it must labor under the pretext that it is
not making law and thus limit its justification for the new rule to
a fictional mechanical application of the existing legislation. 37
This trait is observed in the perfunctory decisions of Civil Law
countries already noted. Second, custom has been obliterated as
a source of law. 38 Thus, in theory the judge is precluded from
using custom as a source of law, unless it has been incorporated
into the code, to define the general terms. Third, the purpose the
law was meant to fulfill cannot be uncovered by asking what
principles of Natural Law this rule is meant to determine and
then using the background Natural Law precepts to understand
the meaning of the general rule. 39 In addition to these problems,
the court faces the problem of a case in which the general rule
fails. The case of the person who, all things considered, should
shout fire in the crowded theater-as when, for example, the fire
detection system is broken and nobody is listening to his quiet
336 See supra text accompanying note 332.

331 See supra text accompanying notes 296-94.
338 MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW, supra note 324, at 144-45.
331 McCall, The Divine Law, supra note 7, at 108.
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warnings. As St. Thomas Aquinas explains, the more contingent
conditions that are added to a case, the more likely a general
precept will not work a just result in some cases or, in other
words, the precept will fail.34 ° It may be that shouting fire is, all
things considered, dangerous but nonetheless should be done in
the circumstances. Thus, even the general rule deserves to go
unobserved in this particular case. The judiciary in such a
system is precluded from legislating an exception or dispensing
from the law since it cannot make law.341
Turning to a legal system built on the understanding of
human law described in Part I, the Game Rule is useful and nonproblematic as a statute.
It appears to be a particular
determination of the Natural Law precepts of preservation and
protection of human life as well as the obligations of living in a
society of social animals. 42 It makes the determination that in
this particular case-a crowded theater-these natural law
precepts would be transgressed by shouting fire. Since statutes
only make particular determinations that are not meant to be
complete, the enactment of the rule contains no danger of
authorizing other equally dangerous behavior that may be
prohibited by custom and judicial analogizing to a similar
scenario, such as shouting "earthquake" in the crowded stadium.
The Game Rule in such a system poses no danger of triggering a
flood of further necessary specifications. It is supplemented by
custom and judicial lawmaking by analogy.
Why then should this Game Rule be adopted in the first
place? The answer might be that it need not be, absent a
particular cause relating to shouting fire in theaters. Custom
may already specify that shouting fire in a theater is a violation
of the relevant Natural Law precepts and courts will hold one
violating it accountable under tort law, for example. In such a
situation, the Game Rule is redundant and should not be
enacted. On the other hand, a legislator may find it necessary to
enact the Game Rule because a court either has attempted to
overturn the old custom, such as by exonerating a fire shouter in
circumstances that in the past would have incurred liability, or
has attempted the initiation of a new bad custom encouraging
340 See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-I, Q. 94, art. 4, at 1011.
141

See id. pt. I-II, Q. 97, art. 4, at 1024 (considering when lawgivers should

dispense).
141

See McCall, The Architecture of Law, supra note 1, at 86-87.
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the fire shouting, or because the community has itself developed
a bad custom of shouting fire in crowded theaters
notwithstanding existing judicially enforced liability. In these
scenarios, the court, or perhaps even the community as a whole,
needs to be reminded of the forgotten general principle of
Natural Law.343 In the job of pruning the development of law, the
legislator enacts this specific Game Rule in response to one of
these particular failings but without attempting to address all
In some cases, a Standards Rule may be
similar cases.
appropriate to remind the communal conscience of the general
principle of Natural Law.3 " In such a case, the human law does
not really make law, but rather repeats an existing precept of
Natural Law in need of reinforcement. Thus, a Game Rule and a
Standards Rule are possible legislative responses to an apparent
need for a statutory correction of some flaw in the legal system.
Yet, because both a Game Rule and a Standards Rule will
function within the integrated hierarchy of law, Natural and
customary included, the problems identified in each type within a
legislatively closed legal system can be avoided.
Turning from the hypothetical example of the fire shouting,
we can see the implications of the foregoing analysis in the
regulation of the financial markets, which markets in the United
States have become dominated by legislative law in the form of
statutes and administrative rules. In 2000, credit default swaps
were completely exempted from state-made Common Law,
including state Common Law affecting gambling contracts by
legislative fiat. 45 Yet, these products that resembled financial
gambling3 4 6 fell outside the complex of Game Rules contained in
federal securities and commodities regulation. 4 7 Due to the
federal preemption, Common Law courts were precluded from
addressing the problems these instruments posed and were
unable to use evolving Common Law standards holding gambling

"I For example, just as the Gauls forgot the Natural Law precept against all
forms of theft. See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-II, Q. 94, art. 4, at 1011
(noting how the Gauls had developed the custom of permitting theft from foreigners
notwithstanding theft clearly being contrary to the Natural Law).
34 See id. (describing a division of human law between general principles (as in
the jus gentium) and particular determinations (as in the jus civile)).
3
See H.R. 5660, 106th Cong. § 408(2)(C) (2000).
346 See Brendan Sapien, Note, Financial Weapons of Mass Destruction: From
Bucket Shops to Credit Default Swaps, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 411, 442 (2010).
34

See id.
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contracts unenforceable as against public policy.3 48
The
unregulated credit default swaps contributed at least in part to
the financial collapse epitomized by the failure of Bear Stems
and Lehman Brothers. 349 Following the financial collapse, the
Dodd-Frank Act's 848 pages was an attempt to add more Game
Rules to address the new contingent matters added to the game
board, the role of risk multiplying credit default swaps in the
financial collapse."
Yet, just as its 2000 predecessor, it
exempted the area from all Common Law. 35 1 Thus, the federal
government remains committed to churning out more Game
Rules fighting the last crisis as the financial markets continue to
evolve. The one legal institution containing the flexibility to
adapt and analogize to the changes, the Common Law courts,
remains excluded from lawmaking under this federal tyranny of
legislative preemption.3 52 Thus, even in a historically Common
Law system, areas of American law have been subjected to
voluminous Game Rules to the exclusion of the Common Law.
The approach that allows law to be made from a variety of
sources thus eliminates many of the problems of legislation in
Common or Civil Law contexts. 3 The Game Rule is no longer
under-inclusive, as it is non-exclusive. Detailed case-by-case
judgments can be made and explained so as to guide
development. Because the Game Rule forces a court doing
anything other than simply applying the rule to the precise case,

348 See, e.g., Schrenger v. Caesars Ind., 825 N.E.2d 879, 882 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)
(declaring that, except for specifically authorized and highly regulated exceptions,
gambling contracts are against public policy); 7 SAMUEL WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 17:1 (4th ed. 2013).
141 See Blake Hornick & Arren Goldman, Commentary, The End of the Reagan
Era of Deregulation and Worship of the Free Markets, 14 No. 17 ANDREWS SEC.
LITIG. & REG. REP. 1, 3 (2008).
350 Id.
351 7 U.S.C.

§ 16(e)(2) (2012) ("This chapter shall supersede and preempt the
application of any State or local law that prohibits or regulates gaming or the
operation of bucket shops ...in the case of... (B) an agreement, contract, or
transaction that is excluded from this chapter under section 2(c) or 2(f) of this title or
sections 27 to 27f of this title, or exempted under section 6(c) of this title (regardless
of whether any such agreement, contract, or transaction is otherwise subject to this
chapter).").
352 See La Porta et al., supra note 245, at 64-65 (arguing that one cause of the
superiority of Common Law systems is their flexibility (or adaptability), enabling

courts to catch evasions).
11 Id. at 42-43.
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to analogize to similar situations or to explain a dispensation
from the law, it encourages the articulation of reasons.3 As
Patrick Brennan explains:
[Jiudges, unlike legislators and legislatures, are required to give
reasons. It is true that legislators often give explanations for
what they are up to in proposing or supporting legislation, but
there is little by way of culture that demands that their reasons
be argued rather than asserted. Legislators can often get by
with progandistic, half-hearted explanations for their
355
decisions.
Statutes, although enacted for reasons, lack a forum for
making the reasons part of the law. As noted in the previous
Subsection, Civil Law judges hesitate to articulate reasons
underpinning their decisions as they are not supposed to be
making law. 35 6 As a result, a system that embraces law
generated through case law will not only address more particular
and contingent situations with equitable rules, but it will also
embody reasoned decisions. 5 7 Reason then becomes a source of
law. As R. Floyd Clarke observed:
It follows that in cases whose subject-matter involves
considerations of equity, a system of decisions of special cases
will produce more justice than a system of general rules
expressed so as to govern all cases. The Case Law decides one
case, the Statute Law attempts to solve many. In short, it is
easier to decide one case correctly and give a true reason
therefor, than it is to decide all cases that may possibly arise
correctly, and by one
form of words express the general rule,
358
and its exceptions.
This is not to say that case law always gets the rule correct.
Still, it implants the rule within a larger system, providing
opportunities to correct the error through distinguishing other
cases or, in appropriate cases, exposing the faulty reasoning and
overturning the rule. 59 The "imperfection of human reasoning
powers" results in the imperfection of the Common Law system,
35 Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Place of "Higher Law" in the Quotidian
Practiceof Law: Herein of PracticalReason, Natural Law, Natural Rights, and Sex

Toys, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 437, 475-76 (2009).

,55Id. at 476.
356 Id. at 475-76.
357 Id. at 476.
3- CLARKE, supra note 250, at 25.
"' See id. at 40.
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but this problem is compounded when imperfection in reasoning
produces a rigid fixed statutory rule applicable to all cases in
theory. 6 ° Rather than the tripartite sources of law formerly
recognized in the Western Tradition, those being reason, custom,
and commands, 361 all Western legal systems, including both
those historically identified as Common Law and those as Civil
Law, are being overwhelmed by tyrannical legislation that
collapses the three sources into one-legislative command. The
result in both Common and Civil Law systems has been a great
increase in the quantity of laws.362
The consequences of the growing exclusivity and quantity of
legislation are many, but this Subsection will focus on two. First,
as noted, it detaches lawmaking from reasoning and customary
history. 63 This Article has already noted the emphasis in
Common Law on the reasoned opinion that is generally absent
from massive legislation, which may be explained in general
terms but rarely contains rational explanations of adopted rules.
Law no longer appears to be a reasoned evolution of rules based
upon a rational analysis of the dialectical interaction of Natural
Law principles and customary practices.
In turn, this detachment of law from rationality contributes
to a growing disrespect for law, the violation of which is no longer
connected either to the transgression of transcendental moral
principles, since human law is no longer seen as determinations
of them, or to the traditions of the community. 64 Although
experts debate the causes, our current prison population is
greater than any country's in recorded history, and it continues
to grow. 365 In particular, instances of white-collar crime are

360 See id.
361

See BERMAN, supra note 205, at 528.

362 See CLARKE, supra note 250, at 334.

See supra Part 1.B.
See id.
365 See What's America's Real Crime Rate?, ECONOMIST (Feb. 14, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2012/02/prisons-and-crime
(" '[I]n 1980, there were about two hundred and twenty people incarcerated for every
hundred thousand Americans; by 2010, the number had more than tripled, to seven
hundred and thirty-one. No other country even approaches that.'" (quoting Adam
Gopnik, The Caging of America: Why Do We Lock up so Many People?, THE NEW
YORKER (Jan. 30, 2012))). But see Richard Fausset, Conservatives Latch onto Prison
Reform, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/28/
nationlla-na-conservative-crime-20110129 (describing the recent successes of Texas
36

364
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increasing,36 6 which indicates a socioeconomically broader
disrespect for law. The typical white-collar criminal is not an
inner-city economically-deprived criminal but rather affluent and
possibly a community leader.3 67 The increase in white-collar
crime demonstrates a weakening concern for respecting the
congressionally-generated statutes designed to regulate the
industries in which they work. These crimes often impact our
societies to a much greater extent than violent crimes, at least in
purely economic terms.368 This disregard of law by wealthy
individuals is exemplified through the individual cases of Martha
Stewart," 9 James Paul Lewis, Jr.,370 and Bernard Madoff, 71 as
well as the corporate cases like Worldcom, Enron, Tyco and
Some academics even argue that corporations
Adelphia 2
should violate the law whenever it is economically efficient to do
so and pay the financial price.3 73 As Harold Berman has
remarked:

and other states reducing or eliminating the trend of increasing prison populations
with prison reform).
I" See Robert S. Mueller, III, Today's FBI: Facts and Figures 2010-2011 37
(Diane Publishing 2011) ("Since 2007, there have been more than 1,700 pending
corporate, securities, commodities, and investment fraud cases," an increase of
thirty-seven percent from 2001).
367 See generally id. at 37-39 (discussing high-profile white-collar crimes).
368 See Corporate Crime and Abuse: Tracking the Problem, CTR. FOR CORPORATE
POLICY (2003-2004), http://www.corporatepolicy.org/issues/crimedata.htm ("[Iun its
2001 report the FBI estimated that the nation's total loss from robbery, burglary,
larceny-theft and motor vehicle theft in 2001 was $17.2 billion-less than a third of
what Enron alone cost investors, pensioners and employees that year.").
369 Martha Stewart Convicted, TIME (Mar. 5, 2004), http://www.time.com/time/
nation/article/0,8599,598286,00.html.
370 Gillian Flaccus, Calif Man Gets 30 Years for Ponzi Scheme, WASH. POST
(May 27, 2006), http.//www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/27/
AR2006052700250.html.
371 Diana B. Henriques, Madoff Is Sentenced to 150 Years for Ponzi Scheme,
N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/30/business/30
madoff.html?pagewanted=all& r=0.
372 WorldCom Scandal One of Many, CNN MONEY (June 27, 2002, 10:13 AM),
See
http://money.cnn.com/2002/06/26/news/companies/accounting-scandals/.
generally Penelope Patsuris, The Corporate Scandal Sheet, FORBES (Aug. 26, 2002),
httpJ/www.forbes.com/2002/07/25/accountingtracker.html.
313 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of
Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1177 n.57 (1982) ("[Mjanagers not only may
but should violate the rules [economic regulatory laws] when it is profitable to do
so."); see also id. at 1168 n.36 (arguing that managers "have no general obligation to
avoid violating regulatory laws, when violations are profitable").
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Almost all the nations of the West are threatened today by a
cynicism about law, leading to a contempt for law, on the part of
all classes of the population.
The cities have become
increasingly unsafe. The welfare system has almost broken
down under unenforceable regulations. There is wholesale
violation of the tax laws by the rich and the poor and those in
between. There is hardly a profession that is not caught up in
evasion of one or another form of governmental regulation. And
the government
itself, from bottom to top, is caught up in
74
illegalities.
Thus, the more commands not based in reason and custom come
to dominate the source of law, the less respect law seems to hold
among the governed.
The second major impact upon human law is the eroding of
the legal principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse, which
"is deep in our law." 7 5 How can American citizens still be
presumed to know the law when the law is composed of libraries
of statute books of Game Rules? In the area of tax law, ignorance
of the law "is a defense, not just in the constitutional sense of
vagueness, but as the flat, unadorned lack of knowledge of the
law."3'76 Professor Sharon Davies has even argued that ignorance
of law is slowly becoming a defense to all crimes.37 7 The legal
maxim made sense when laws were either restatements of
Natural Law, which is able to be known by all, such as do not
murder the innocent,3 78 or were the product of longstanding
customs, which due to their age were clearly known by the
community in general. Specific enactments must be promulgated
and accepted (as discussed in Part I) so that variations from
longstanding customs become well known.
The maxim is
reasonable in such a context. Yet, it becomes a legal fiction, and
arguably an absurd one, when the law has become a mountain of
detailed Game Rules or vague Standard Rules lacking
connections to both Natural Law and longstanding custom.

...BERMAN, supra note 205, at 40.
...Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 243 (1957).
376 Mark D. Yochum, Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse Except for Tax Crimes,
27 DUQ. L. REV. 221, 223 (1989).
177
Sharon L. Davies, The Jurisprudenceof Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of
Excusable Ignorance, 48 DUKE L.J. 341, 342 (1998).
378 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 13, pt. I-1I, Q. 94, art. 4, at 1011 ("It is
therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether of speculative or of
practical reason, truth or rectitude is the same for all, and is equally known by all.").
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Obviously the policy implications of allowing such a defense are
significant. Yet, is justice really worked when the law through
its sheer quantity and disconnection to Natural Law or custom
becomes unknowable?
CONCLUSION

Part I described the role of human lawmaking within the
grand architecture of law as the progressive decoration of the
structure with specific determinations of the general principles.
The process weaves deductive reasoning from principles of
practical reason together with inductive discovery of principles
through developing customs. 79 Statutory and customary law
interact dialectically to prune customary development of human
determinations of the Natural Law. 8 ° Unlike H. L. A. Hart, who
saw Natural Law-and morality generally-and human positive
law as opposed to or at least existing on separate planes,38 ' the
Natural Law tradition seems them as coterminous. "The
immutable idea of right [Natural Law or jus] dwells in the
changing positive law."" 2
Part II has applied this jurisprudential framework to a more
detailed consideration of the nature of a legal system. Among the
two idealized types, the Common Law tradition, with its
developing judge-made law with a flexible rule of stare decisis
interacting with periodic necessary statutes, appeared to embody
the philosophy of Part I more than Civil Law codes.383 Part II
also lamented the takeover of law by legislative statutes not only
in the realm of Civil Law codes but also in formerly Common
Law systems, which are increasingly dominated by voluminous
Game Rules. The explosion of legislation either in the form of
codes of abstract standards or American-style exponentially
growing Game Rules, appears to contribute to a lack of respect
for law. 31 4 The elimination, or at least overwhelming by sheer
volume, of reason (Natural Law principles) and developing
custom has eliminated both knowledge of and respect for law,
379
380
381
382

1946).
38
3

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part I.B.
See generally, HART, supra note 201, at 181-207.
HEINRICH A. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW 17-18 (Thomas R. Hanley trans.,
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.A.
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leading some to challenge the viability of the maxim that
ignorance of the law is no excuse.38 To return to the architecture
analogy, the vision of human lawmaking described in Part I may
result in the decoration of a structure slowly and eclectically
transcending various architectural styles.
Like Chartres
Cathedral, the law may be a structure decorated with
Romanesque, Gothic, and Baroque ornaments woven together.
Yet, the triumph of legislation has papered over the structure
with a dizzying array of disjointed pieces of paper, piled so high
that they obscure the foundation and the architectural structure.
Whereas
code countries
have whitewashed
over the
interconnected architectural styles with a uniform abstract code,
Common Law countries continue to churn out paper to obscure
the structure. The aesthetically displeasing result was poetically
predicted by John Pretiss Bishop in his polemical arguments
against the adoption of the legislation-dominated code system
when he wrote:
And she [England] threatens to substitute acts of Parliament
for all her common law of reason; and make it possible for
sluggards and fools to practise at her bar and preside in her
courts. If she does it, it requires no gift of prophecy to foresee
that her encompassing seas will weep upon the dripping rocks
around that little island a more mournful requiem to her
entombed empire than
was ever before sung over fallen
38 6
greatness and glory.

385 Davies, supra note 377, at 343.
386

BISHOP, supra note 263, at 8.

